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Motivation and Overview
Despite a widespread consensus on the contractionary effects of the US
financial crisis of 2008-09, key questions remain on how stress in the finan-
cial markets has been transmitted to the wider economy. Arguably the US
mortgage sector was at the centerstage when the crisis broke out. In spite
of significant government intervention1 and a recapitalization of US banks, a
number of vulnerabilities remain in the housing sector up to this day. Debates
on the appropriate measures that have to be taken to deal with foreclosures
and negative home equity in a cost-effective way remain as heated as ever.2
Turning to a more aggregate level, stress in the financial sector (so not nec-
essarily related to housing) is still weighing on economic activity. To even
address this problem, researchers have to develop a tool to measure the aggre-
gate level of financial stress. Assuming one can identify this type of financial
stress, a natural question is then how strains in financial markets affect the
wider economy. Policymakers have additional concerns as they want to know
if and to what extent policy actions can mitigate adverse effects of sharply
increasing financial stress.
The goal of this dissertation is to use statistical tools to analyze specific
financial risks that have played dominant roles in the recent crisis. More
concretely, I propose an appropriate econometric methodology to study two
types of risks. The first risk relates to the level of aggregate stress in the
1Most notably through putting Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship and
bailing American International Group (AIG) out.
2Foreclosure is the legal process by which a mortgage lender (such as a bank) obtains
a termination of a mortgage after the borrower has failed to comply with the mortgage
agreement. Negative equity occurs when the value of the house used to secure a mortgage
is less than the outstanding loan balance.
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financial markets and the second one concerns the US housing market. There
are in fact two prominent risks associated with a US mortgage, as borrowers
can both prepay or default on a mortgage. Prior to the financial crisis of
2008-09 financial markets participants failed to accurately price the default
risk involved with mortgage related financial products, leaving the financial
system too weak and unprepared to absorb these losses internally. Unrealized
losses on mortgage-backed securities then put the asset side of banks’ balance
sheets under pressure. Banks in turn tightened credit and stress spread from
financial markets to households and firms.
x
Chapter 1
Key Financial Risks in 2008-09
1.1 Aggregate Financial Risk
Starting in August of 2007, the U.S. economy was hit by the most serious
financial disruption since the Great Depression of the early 1930s. The sub-
sequent financial crisis, which receded during the course of 2009, was followed
by the most severe recession in the post World War II period, with unemploy-
ment rising above 10 percent. This shock to the U.S. economy has brought
to the fore the importance of financial market conditions to macroeconomic
outcomes.
A very rich literature has examined the interaction between the finan-
cial system and the real economy from a theoretical point of view.1 One of
the most widely discussed channels is based on a business cycle model with
financial imperfections that arise as a consequence of information asymme-
tries between borrowers and lenders. The amplification and propagation of
a credit shock then typically operates through a balance sheet effect. An
increase in asset prices increases the net worth of firms, households, and
improves the capacity to borrow, invest or consume. Through general equi-
librium effects, this dynamic can then lead to further increases in asset prices.
Conversely, a negative shock operates in the opposite direction. Of course
1Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) are among the most
cited papers.
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there are many other channels beside this so-called "financial accelerator"
mechanism. Herd behavior of bank managers can lead to a deterioration of
credit standards during periods of strong growth. Down the road, this can
lead to a deterioration of banks’ asset quality that could force bank to re-
duce loan growth and depress economic activity. Institutional memory can
matter as well, with loan officers tending to become more lenient on lending
standards as previous loan busts disappear from memory.
Chapter 2 presents an empirical macro model, based on structural VAR
analysis, to estimate the impact of financial stress on economic activity. I
hereby assume that higher levels of financial stress are associated with an
increase in the aggregate risk implied by a large set of financial variables.
Financial stress episodes are characterized by an increase in credit, liquidity
and market risks. Events of market turmoil, such as the credit crunch of
2008-09, affect the real economy by boosting the cost of credit. This process
can make business, households and financial institutions highly cautious and
influence their consumption and investment decisions.
Though a number of recent papers have studied the effects of stress in
the financial sector on the wider real economy empirically, my paper offers
a number of new insights.2 First, I shows that there is a multi-dimensional
response of the real economy to financial stress. For example, there is a
marked and immediate response of the labor market following an increase
in financial stress increases. Moreover, my analysis hints at a significant
response of monetary policy to financial stress. When financial conditions
deteriorate, short-dated rates are driven lower by the monetary authorities.
Another contribution of this dissertation is showing that financial market
shocks also generated a significant response on the real economy before the
credit crunch of 2008.
2See Cardarelli et al. (2009), Carlson et al. (2009), Davig and Hakkio (2010) and
Meeks (2011).
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1.2 Risks on the Mortgage Market
As the housing bubble burst in late 2006 and prices declined, mortgage
holders counting on home price appreciation were unable to pay their mort-
gages or refinance.3 Consequently, delinquency rates on mortgage payments
and foreclosures increased. Lenders, mortgage guarantors, including the
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), and owners of MBS experienced
severe losses because they underestimated the default risk of mortgages orig-
inated in the 2000s.
Three years after the financial crisis of 2008-09, many US households re-
main highly indebted with many having negative equity on their mortgage.
Weakened household balance sheets, reduced income and widespread unem-
ployment have left many borrowers unable to qualify for refinancing. This
means that they cannot take advantage of the record low mortgage rates.
In addition, lenders and mortgage guarantors have instituted more stringent
underwriting requirements. This has left many borrowers unable to qualify
for a new loan even if they have remained current on their existing mortgages.
Policymakers have responded to these tighten lending conditions by in-
troducing new refinance programs, such as the GSEs’ Home Affordable Re-
finance Program, HARP, and a number of other programs offered by FHA.
Under the terms of these programs, participants should be able to lower their
monthly mortgage payments and free up household income for non-housing
expenditures. It could also help certain struggling borrowers avoid a future
default. Although those programs have helped some homeowners, program
features and eligibility criteria exclude a significant number of borrowers who
would benefit from a refinancing. A refinancing program that relaxed LTV
limits and income tests, waived appraisal requirements, or allowed delinquent
borrowers to participate in the program, could make refinancing at current
market rates feasible or less expensive for many borrowers.4 The averted de-
3Refinancing refers to the replacement of an existing mortgage with a new mortgage
under different terms.
4Loan to value (LTV) is the amount of mortgage debt outstanding divided by the
assessed value of the home.
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faults could benefit borrowers and lower federal guarantee costs.5 However,
it would be costly to mortgage investors, who would experience losses on
mortgages that are prepaid more rapidly than in the absence of the program.
Models such as the ones presented in Chapter 3 are a central input in
the analysis of the effect of mortgage policies. Any mortgage pricing, and
as a consequence any policy proposal, needs to take into account the fac-
tors determining the default and prepayment probabilities of a mortgage.
An econometric model can be used for scenario analysis evaluating how the
policy implementation would affect borrowers decision to default or prepay.
Moreover, it is very important for a mortgage originator to project the pre-
payment and default rates of his portfolio of mortgages and demand adequate
compensation in the form of higher coupon rates.
Chapter 3 presents a micro model to estimate the default and prepayment
probabilities of a mortgage given its characteristics and the macroeconomic
environment. This is a challenging task because the dynamics underlying the
borrower’s decision process involve both financial and behavioral elements.
The approach I take in this dissertation models default and prepayment
probabilities in a random utility framework using multinomial logit models.
These models are well suited because of the competing nature of the two
risks and their ability to include time-varying covariates. A key question
in specifying a mortgage model regards the potential impact of borrowers’
unobservable heterogeneity on the estimated probabilities from a standard
multinomial model. To address this question, I compare multinomial logit
models with fixed and borrower-specific random coefficients. I find signif-
icant unobservable heterogeneity in borrowers response to factors affecting
the decision to terminate a mortgage, especially by prepayment. My results
signal a potentially serious misspecification under the assumption of fixed co-
efficients. There is nevertheless room for more work as the in-sample fitting
improvement is small.6
5The GSEs and FHA, which guarantee approximately 95% of mortgages currently
originated in the US, are part of the US federal government.
6This result is in line with the gain from accounting for unobservable heterogeneity in
other types of models suggested in the literature. Deng, Quigley and Van Order (2000)
propose a proportional hazard model with unobservable heterogeneity as discrete mass
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I estimate the model on a set of mortgages guaranteed by FHA, which is a
United States government agency that provides mortgage insurance on loans
made throughout the United States. It is the largest insurer of mortgages
in the world. Unlike conventional loans that adhere to strict underwriting
guidelines, FHA-insured loans require very little cash investment to close
a loan. The down payment required to obtain a FHA mortgage is 3.5%.
FHA provides mortgage insurance to the borrower against the payment of
a mortgage premium. As issuance on the subprime7 market came to halt
in 2007-08, many of the riskiest borrowers ended up borrowing from the
Federal Housing Administration. In fact, the volume of mortgage origination
guaranteed by FHA went from 2% in 2006 to 17% in 2010. Given this rapid
growth and the weak recovery, some observers have warned that the FHA
could suffer substantial losses in the next years, and the type of models
developed in Chapter 3 can be used as a foundation for cost benefit analysis
of different policy measures and macroeconomic scenarios.
points. The increment in the value of the likelihood in their model with unobservable
heterogeneity compared to the same model without the unobservable heterogeneity is
small.
7Subprime loans are loans offered to individuals who do not qualify for prime rate
loans. They are characterized by higher interest rates and less favorable terms in order to
compensate for higher credit risk.
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Chapter 2
Measuring the Impact of
Financial Stress on Economic
Activity
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter I estimate the impact of stress in financial markets on
the U.S. economy using structural VAR analysis (SVAR). In the last three
decades financial markets developments not closely related to the stance of
monetary policy have played an increasing role in economic activity.1 Events
of market turmoil, such as the credit crunch of 2008-2009, have affected the
real economy by boosting the cost of credit and making firms, households
and financial institutions highly cautious. This observation raises a number
of questions. The first one relates to the way financial stress is transmitted
through the economy. How are different sectors of the economy affected when
financial conditions become tighter? A closely related question is more policy
related. What actions can policymakers (for example a central bank) take in
response to a sharp deterioration in financial conditions? More concretely, it
1One example of financial development not closely related to monetary policy was the
increasing popularity of securitization of assets such as mortgages. Private securitization
market had grown since the early 90’s and came to an halt during the financial crisis of
2008-2009.
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would be helpful to know which variables have responded significantly to a
change in the policy rate in the past decades. To answer these questions a
comprehensive statistical measure of financial stress will be needed to gauge
the aggregate level of stress in the financial sector.
As market participants consider a wide range of variables to determine
prevailing conditions across financial markets, I construct a financial stress
index (FSI) that distills information from a broad set of variables. The se-
lected financial indicators measure financial conditions while excluding vari-
ables closely linked to monetary policy such as the federal funds target rate
set by the Federal Reserve. I measure financial stress across markets as the
latent variable driving the co-movement of all the variables. Specifically, I
turn to principal component analysis to estimate the FSI.
My empirical macro model shows that there is a multi-dimensional re-
sponse of the real economy to financial stress. The main advantage of using
SVARs is that this methodology allows for a structural interpretation of the
effect of a shock in one variable (such as financial stress or the policy rate)
on another variable (e.g. investment or labor market). Following an unex-
pected increase in FSI, there is a statistically significant drop in GDP and
its components such as consumption and investment. In addition, I find that
there is a marked response of the labor market to an innovation in the FSI.
Moreover, my analysis hints at a significant response of monetary policy to
stress. In the wake of a deterioration of financial conditions, short-dated
rates are driven lower by the monetary authorities. Interestingly enough,
these findings still hold if I exclude the 2008 financial crisis from the sample.
It is noteworthy that traditional macroeconomic models (such as Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (2005)) have a very stylized approach to the finan-
cial sector. These models do not study how endogenous developments in
the financial sector could have an effect on the real economy. In contrast,
my results suggest that shocks emanating from the financial sector played a
significant role in understanding the dynamic interaction of macroeconomic
variables even prior to the financial crisis of 2008.
The chapter is organized as follow. Section 2 defines financial stress and
highlights key phenomena that are generally associated with financial stress.
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Section 3 discusses indices of financial stress available in the literature. Sec-
tion 4 describes the financial stress index (FSI). Section 5 presents the VAR
analysis, and studies the linkage between financial stress and economy activ-
ity. Section 6 analyzes the interaction between monetary policy and financial
stress. Section 7 concludes the chapter.
2.2 Defining Financial Stress
Financial stress can be thought of as an interruption to the normal func-
tioning of financial markets. This type of stress increases with expected
financial loss, with risk and with uncertainty. Under the term risk, I under-
stand a widening in the distribution of probable loss while uncertainty means
lower confidence about the shape of the distribution of probable loss. It is
the consequence of a growing vulnerability in the way the financial system is
structured and will respond to some exogenous shock. Such a shock is more
likely to result in stress when financial conditions are weak or the structure
of the financial system is fragile.
Haikko and Keeton (2009) discuss the key features of financial stress
which are summarized in the remainder of this section.
Increased uncertainty about fundamental value of assets
Investors and lenders are increasingly uncertain about the expected future
cash flow of their investments and this uncertainty translates into greater
volatility in the market prices of assets. For example, stock prices depend
on expected future dividends. If investors revise their estimate of future
dividends every time there is new information in the market, this will cause
the stock price to move more. The greater uncertainty may reflects greater
uncertainty about the macroeconomic outlook on which the future cash flow
from an investment depends. Uncertainty about the fundamental value of
assets can also increase when financial innovation make it difficult for lenders
and investors to price assets.
9
Increased uncertainty about behavior of other investors
During financial stress investors tend to base their decisions on guesses
about other investors’ behavior. For example, this happens when investors
discover that their assumptions about a new financial product were incorrect
and they are uncertain about its fundamental value. If an investor decides to
sell an asset before maturity, the return also depend on the actions of other
market’s participants. In case of increased uncertainty about the behavior
of other investors prices of financial assets become less tied to fundamentals
and this translates in more volatile asset prices.
Increased asymmetry of information
Asymmetry of information between investors and borrowers typically
worsen during financial stress leading to an increase in the cost of borrowing.
Information gaps can lead to adverse selection or moral hazard. If investors
are not able to distinguish among firms of different risk they will require a
return more appropriate for firms of average quality from all of them. At
that rate, the higher quality companies will fund internally and the only
companies willing to accept the return required by investors will be the low
quality firms. As a consequence, the mix of companies worsen and investors
require even higher return. Another way information asymmetry can worsen
during market turmoil is when investors rely on third parties, such a credit
rating agencies, to determine risks. If investors doubt the objectivity of these
ratings, information asymmetry will arise and they will demand an higher
return.
Increased risk aversion
Periods of market turmoil are characterized by "flight to quality", that
is investors will demand higher returns for risky assets and lower returns on
safe assets so that the spread between the two widens.2 Investors’ appetite
for risk varies over the business cycle and in response to unexpected events.
2Tarashev, Tsatsaronis and Karampatos (2003) and Kumar and Persaud (2002), among
others, develop theory-based indexes of risk appetite.
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During booms investors tend to underestimate risk and ignore "fat tails", the
non-negligible probability of extreme losses. Such euphoria leads to some bad
loans and investments and investors eventually incur losses. On the contrary,
after the bust they overestimate the risk of losses. Another reason why
appetite for risk falls during financial crisis is people become more uncertain
about the future of the economy and their future income. Therefore, they
will require greater compensation to hold risky assets.
Increased liquidity risk
An illiquid asset is one that the holder cannot confidently sell to a price
close to its fundamental value when faced with a sudden and unexpected
need of cash. An asset may be illiquid because its secondary market may be
thin, so that selling a large amount of it has a remarkable effect on the price.
In addition, an asset may be illiquid because it is above-average quality and
the asymmetry of information between seller and buyer prevent the owner
to sell the asset at a price close to its fundamental value. During times of
financial stress leveraged investors need to hold liquid assets because they
can sell them more easily if they receive a margin call.3 In the case of asset
managers, they may receive redemptions requests and they need to liquidate
assets to meet them. The effect of "flight to liquidity" is to increase the
spread between return on liquid and illiquid assets.
2.3 Literature on Financial Stress Index
This section examines how financial stress indexes have been constructed
in the literature. Illing and Liu (2006) develop one of the first and most
influential composite indices of financial stress. They construct a financial
3Margin buying is buying securities with cash borrowed from a broker, using other
securities as collateral. The net value, i.e. the difference between the value of the securities
and the loan, is initially equal to the amount of one’s own cash used. This difference has to
stay above a minimum margin requirement, the purpose of which is to protect the broker
against a fall in the value of the securities to the point that the investor can no longer
cover the loan. When the margin posted in the margin account is below the minimum
margin requirement, the broker or exchange issues a margin call.
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stress index for the Canadian economy. In their paper, they explore several
different weighting schemes to combine financial variables into a composite
index. Their index is composed of a corporate bond spread, the bid-ask
spread of 90-day Canada T-bill, a measure of volatility of the overall stock
market and the beta of the banking sector.4 They also include exchange rate
volatility. Compared to the US, this is a key variable for an open economy
such as Canada. Their FSI also includes the slope of the yield curve, which
reveals more about the stance of the monetary policy than financial stress.
They conduct an internal Bank of Canada survey to determine which events
were perceived as stressful and they evaluate the indexes constructed with
different methodologies based on their ability to match the results of the
survey. They choose to weight the variables by the relative size of the market
to which they pertain because this scheme is economically meaningful and it
has the lowest Type I and II errors.5
Cardarelli et al. (2009) construct a financial stress index for 17 different
countries. They limit their analysis to variables that are available for all 17
countries. The variables that they select are very similar to Illing and Liu
(2006) except that they do no include any liquidity measure. Variables are
weighted in the index by their variance. They use the FSIs to conduct a cross
section study to examine why some financial stress episodes lead to economic
downturns. They find that the likelihood that financial stress will be followed
by a downturn is associated with the extent to which house prices and aggre-
gate credit have risen prior to stress episodes. Their analysis suggests that
both slowdowns and recessions preceded by banking stress tend to last longer,
and are associated with larger average GDP losses, than those preceded by
different types of financial stress, or no financial stress at all. Countries
whose financial systems are dominated by more arm’s-length based transac-
tions, as opposed to traditional relationship-based intermediation, tend to
exhibit higher pro cyclical leverage, indicating that the amplifying role of
4In the Capital Asset Pricing Model the beta coefficient describes the relationship
between an investment’s return and the overall market’s return. See Campbell, Lo and
MacKinlay (1997).
5Type I error is the probability of failing to signal a crisis. Type II error is the proba-
bility of falsely signaling a crisis.
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financial system in propagating shocks is more pronounced.6
Hakkio and Keeton (2009) construct a financial stress index for the U.S.
(KCFSI) using principal components. The index is composed of 11 indicators
that capture the features of financial stress that I discuss in Section 2.2. They
find that the KCFSI helps predict the Chicago Fed National Activity Index
(CFNAI).7
A related literature focuses on measuring the broader financial condi-
tions as a predictor of growth. The set of variables considered in financial
condition indices (FCI) often include real interest rates and real exchange
rate. Therefore, FCIs also evaluate the stance of monetary policy. Goodhart
and Hofmann (2001) derive the weights based on the coefficients estimates
in an IS equation relating the output gap to deviations of the short-term
real interest rate, the effective real exchange rate, real house prices and real
share prices from their long term trend. They also derive an alternative
index using VAR and impulse response analyis. In this case, weights are
based on the average response of inflation over the twelve quarters following
a one-standard deviation shock to the same set of variables included in the
IS equation. They study whether these two indexes contain useful informa-
tion about future inflationary pressure. They find that the out-of-sample
forecasting performance of the FCIs is rather disappointing. Guichard and
Turner (2008) set the index weights from a regression of the output gap on a
distributed lag of real short and long interest rates, high-yield bond spread, a
measure of credit availability, real exchange rate and stock market capitaliza-
tion as a share of GDP.8 They also derive the weights from the accumulated
response of GDP growth to a one-standard deviation shock to each financial
variables in a VAR system of GDP growth, core inflation and the same set of
financial variables.9 Swinston (2008) also adopts the impulse response analy-
sis approach. He set the weights from the cumulative response of GDP to an
6Leverage is defined as the ratio of assets to equity.
7The Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI) is a monthly index designed to
gauge overall economic activity and related inflationary pressure in the U.S..
8The Federal Loan Officers Opinion Survey provides responses on the number of banks
tightening credit standards over a three-month period.
9They follow the approach of Pesaran and Shin (1998) to perform impulse response
analysis.
13
orthogonalized shock in each financial indicator in a VAR system. The finan-
cial variables that he includes in the VAR are lending standards, investment
grade yield, LIBOR, high-yield spread , real equity returns and real effec-
tive exchange rate. Macroeconomic Advisers (1998) and Dudley and Hatzius
(2000) employ large-scale macroeconometric models.
Hatzius et al. (2010) estimate a financial condition index with the latent
factor of an unbalanced panel of financial indicators. They apply the EM
algorithm as proposed by Stock and Watson (2002) to estimate it. In this
way, the set of financial indicators included in the index grows over time as
new indicators become available. They eliminate variability in the financial
variables that can be explained by current and past real activity and inflation
so that the first principal components reflects exogenous information asso-
ciated with the financial sector rather than feedback from macroeconomic
conditions. Brave and Butters (2011) extend the approach of Hatzius et al.
(2010) by including variables with mixed frequency and estimate the latent
factor of one hundred financial indicators with the methodology proposed by
Doz, Giannone and Reichlin (2011). Both papers include variables indicative
of the stance of monetary policy such as money stock and Treasury rates.
One notable disadvantage of FCIs as constructed by Hatzius et al. (2010)
and Brave and Butters (2011) is that their size and estimation make it more
cumbersome to update and use.
2.4 Estimating the Level of Financial Stress
There are two steps in constructing a FSI. I need to determine (i) the
choice of variables that make up the index and (ii) the weighting scheme.
The first subsection describes the variables included in the index. I then
show how the variables are aggregated into a single index.
2.4.1 Variables Included in the FSI
Each of the variables included in the FSI should capture one or more of
the features of financial stress described in Section 2.2. I have also tried to be
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parsimonious in the choice of variables. The goal is to use a minimum set of
variables that would signal financial stress. Because of common components,
the qualitative patterns of many financial series are similar and the marginal
informative content of additional series diminishes quite rapidly. Moreover,
disruptions in one market can easily spill over to others.
I define financial stress as the key factor driving the co-movement of the
different variables. Of course each variable can also change for other reasons
not directly related to financial stress. The variables are chosen for their time-
liness, forward-looking information content, systemic relevance, and ability
to reflect agents’ behavior. In addition, variables must be available since at
least 1990 on a weekly basis.
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics of the variables that make up the
index. The set of selected variables is similar to Hakkio and Keeton (2009). I
select the same variables except for the idiosyncratic volatility of bank stock
prices and a measure of the cross-sectional dispersion of stock returns in the
banking sector. Instead, I consider a measure of relative riskiness of the
financial sector compared to the overall corporate sector. Moreover, I also
add a measure of the volatility of Treasury yields (MOVE index), a measure
of risk aversion (money market mutual funds total assets as a share of NYSE
capitalization) and two mortgage-related variables (the mortgage spread and
the MBS spread over 10-year Treasury rate).
TED spread. The Ted spread is computed as the difference between
the three-month LIBOR rate and the three-month Treasury bill rate. The
LIBOR is the rate at which banks can borrow unsecured, dollar-denominated
funds in the interbank market. This spread provides a measure of flight to
quality, flight to liquidity and asymmetry of information in the money mar-
ket. The TED spread increases when banks fear the loan may not be repaid
(default risk), or because banks worry they will experience an unexpected
need for funds in the short term before the loan comes due (liquidity risk).
This spread also goes up when banks are afraid of adverse selection and have
difficulty determining which borrowing banks are problematic.
Total assets in money market mutual funds as a percentage of
NYSE capitalization. It is computed as the ratio of total assets in money
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market mutual funds to the NYSE market capitalization. This ratio increases
when investors become more risk averse. When risk appetite for equities
lowers investors move funds out of the stock market and into the safer money
market.
Aaa/10-year Treasury spread. Bonds rated Aaa by Moody’s pose
little or no default risk. The spread of Aaa bond rate over the 10-year Trea-
sury yield can be decomposed as the sum of a prepayment risk premium and
a liquidity premium. Many Aaa corporate bonds are callable and investors
demand a prepayment risk premium for the possibility that borrowers will
refinance their debt if interest rates fall. The prepayment risk premium can
vary over time not only due to changes in the risk that market interest rates
will vary but also due to changes in the practices regarding call provisions
in bond issues, as emphasized by Duffee’s (1998) research. The Aaa/10-year
Treasury spreads also contains a liquidity premium associated with a more
stable demand for Treasury securities. The liquidity premium is usually small
and less important. However, when financial markets are turbulent, the liq-
uidity premium can become substantial as even the highest-rated corporate
bonds tend to be less liquid than Treasury securities.
Baa/Aaa spread. It is computed as the difference between the yield of
Moody’s Baa rated bonds and the yield of Aaa bonds. This spread largely
reflects default premium because corporate bonds have similar callability pro-
visions. It is an indicator of flight to quality and asymmetry of information.
The spread between Baa and Aaa is small during economic expansion and
increases when investors are worried of higher default risk because of the
state of the economy or the financial health of lower rated corporations. In
some cases, the spread can also increase as an over-reaction to a prolonged
period of excess optimism. During periods of financial stress, investors may
also worry that some Baa rated companies may be riskier than other and
fear adverse selection, which will cause the Baa rate to move further above
the Aaa yield.10
High-yield bond/Baa spread. High-yield bonds are bonds rated below
10Bernanke and Gertler (1995) call the part of the yield due to information asymmetry
external finance premium.
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investment grade. These bonds have a higher risk of default but pay higher
yield. The difference in default risk between high-yield and Baa bonds is
generally greater than between Baa and Aaa bonds. Therefore, this spread
should tend to respond earlier to flight to quality and asymmetry of infor-
mation because junk bonds are issued by firms that are more vulnerable to
changes in economic conditions than investment-grade borrowers. As dis-
cussed in Kwan (2001), speculative-grade bonds carry more liquidity risk
because the speculative-grade bond market is thinner than the investment
grade market and institutional investors are prohibited from investing in it.
2-year swap spread. An interest rate swap is a derivative contract in
which a party exchanges a stream of fixed rate payments for another party’s
floating-rate payments. In the case of a 2-year swap contract, the two parties
agree to exchange payments for two years. The floating rate is based on
the three-month LIBOR rate. The two-year swap spread is the difference
between the 2-year swap fixed rate and the rate of comparable maturity
Treasury note. Grinblatt (2002) explains that the spread is positive for two
reasons. The first one is to compensate for the default risk of the fixed payer.
If the two counterparties merely exchanged the Treasury yield for the LIBOR
rate, the fixed payer would have borrowed at the risk-free rate and invested
an the LIBOR rate. The spread is also positive to compensate the floating
payer for the lower liquidity of the swap contract compared to the two-year
Treasury note. Therefore, the swap spread increases (i) when LIBOR goes up
because of increased default risk in the interbank market (flight to quality),
(ii) when investors are concerned that they will need the funds before the
swap expires or (iii) when liquidity risk increased in the interbank market
(flight to liquidity).
ABS/5-year Treasury spread. Asset-backed securities are securities
whose value and income payments are derived from and collaterized by pools
of credit card loans, auto loans, or student loans. These securities are typi-
cally issued in tranches, with the senior trances receiving the highest rating
but also the lowest return. ABS yield is measured using the Citigroup Global
Market ABS Index. The ABS spread over Treasury yield is small in normal
times. It may rise during market turmoil when investors become more con-
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cerned of default by consumers and require higher compensation to hold these
securities. This spread also provides a measure of asymmetry of information.
In normal times issuers of securities backed by consumers loans securitize the
higher quality to preserve their long run reputation (see Calomiris and Ma-
son, 2004). During periods of financial stress, some issuers may be tempted
to retain the higher-quality loans on their balance sheet and securitize the
lower-quality loans. Suspecting such behavior, investors may demand higher
yields to purchase asset-based securities.
MBS/10-year Treasury spread. MBS securities are asset-backed se-
curities collaterized by mortgages. The MBS yield is measured with the Cit-
igroup Global Markets MBS yield index. The spread is the sum of default
and prepayment risk premia.
Correlation between returns on stocks and Treasury bonds. In
normal times returns on stocks and government bonds are either uncorrelated
or move together in response to changes in the risk-free discount rate. During
financial stress investors shift out of stocks and into bonds, causing the return
on the two assets to move in opposite directions (see Andersson and others,
2008; Baur and Lucey, 2009). Thus, the stock-bond correlation is a measure
of risk aversion. The correlation is computed over rolling three-month periods
using the total return indexes of S&P500 and 2-year Treasury bond. I take
the negative value of the correlation to construct the index, so that negative
correlation corresponds to an increase in financial stress.
Implied volatility of S&P500 options (VIX). The VIX is a measure
of overall volatility of stock prices and it captures uncertainty about the
fundamental value of assets and uncertainty about the behavior of other
investors. It is considered the premier barometer of investor sentiment. The
VIX index is constructed using the implied volatilities of a wide range of
S&P500 index options. This volatility is meant to be forward looking and is
calculated from both calls and puts. The VIX is quoted in percentage points
and translates, roughly, to the expected movement in the S&P 500 over the
next 30-day period, which is then annualized.
Implied volatility of Treasury options (MOVE). The Merrill Lynch
Option Volatility Estimate (MOVE) Index tracks how much traders expect
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Treasuries maturing in 2 to 30 years to fluctuate in a year and is a proxy
of bond market risk. The MOVE is a yield curve weighted index of the
normalized implied volatility on 1-month Treasury options. It is the weighted
average of volatilities on the on-the-run Treasuries with maturities 2, 5, 10,
and 30 years.
Off-the-run/on-the-run 10-year Treasury spread. The spread be-
tween the off-the-run and the on-the-run yields widens when investors become
more concerned of liquidity risk. The on-the-run 10-year Treasury rate is the
yield on the most recently issued 10-year Treasury bond while the off-the-run
rate is the 10-year Treasury rate computed from the Treasury yield curve es-
timated using all the previous Treasury issuances that are still outstanding11.
The market for an off-the-run Treasury security is generally not as deep as
the market for an on-the-run security of the same maturity. As a result, an
investor holding the off-the-run security faces more risk of having to sell the
security at a discount if he faces a sudden need of cash.
Financial/Corporate bond spread. This spread measures the relative
riskiness of lending to the financial sector compared to lending to the corpo-
rate sector. It is computed as the difference between the Citigroup Global
Markets financial yield index and the Citigroup Global Markets corporate
index.
30-year mortgage rate/10-year Treasury spread. It is computed as
the difference between the 30-year mortgage rate and the 10-year Treasury
rate. It is the sum of a prepayment risk premium and a default risk premium.
It increases with increased expected default in the mortgage market.
2.4.2 Aggregating the Variables into a FSI
Financial stress is defined as the main factor driving co-movement of
the variables described above. I estimate the FSI with the first principal
component of the correlation matrix of the variables included in the index.12
The index is constructed at monthly frequency. The selected variables are
11I estimate the off-the-run Treasury curve using the methodology introduced by
Gurkaynak et al. (2007).
12See Theil (1971) for a discussion of principal component analysis.
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also available at weekly frequency so that the index can be constructed weekly
to monitor financial markets at a higher frequency. Table 2.1 presents sample
statistics of the variables that make up the index.
Define X as the matrix of standardized variables in which each column
contains T observations of a financial indicator normalized to have mean zero
and standard deviation one. Table 2.2 presents Σ, the estimated correlation
matrix of the variables included in the index. The spectral decomposition of
Σ is given by:
Σ = QΛQ−1.
The factor loadings of the first principal component are in q1, the first column
of Q. We normalized q1 by dividing it by λ1, the first element of the diagonal
matrix Λ, so that the index has unit standard deviation and each coefficient
represents the change in the index after one standard deviation increase in
the variable.
FSIt = Xt
q1
λ1
t = 1, . . . , T.
The estimated index is shown in Figure 2.1 and the weights assigned to the
variables are presented in Table 2.3. The coefficients range from 0.04 for
the MBS/10-year Treasury spread to 0.11 for ABS/5-year Treasury spread,
Baa/Aaa spread, high-yield/Baa spread and the VIX index. Over the sample
period, the index explains 59% of the total variation in the 14 variables.
2.4.3 Identifying Episodes of Financial Stress
The FSI does a good job in capturing past episodes of financial stress.
The index first peaked during the 1990-1991 recession. The period between
1998-2002 was characterized by several financial stress events. The first peak
of the period is in October 1998, just after the Russian debt moratorium in
August and the bail out of the hedge fund Long Term Capital Management
in September. The index peaks again in early 2000 when the prices of tech-
nology stocks collapsed. There is another peak in September 2001 after the
terrorist attack in New York City. The last peak of the period 1998-2002 is
in October 2002 and can be attributed to the accounting scandals of 2002
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and mounting investors concern about the accuracy of corporations’ financial
statements.
The years 2003-2007, a period with substantial appreciation of house
prices, was a buoyant period in the financial markets. In 2007 investors
showed the first concerns about the quality of subprime mortgages. Ma-
jor banks announced writedowns of mortgage products and rating agencies
downgraded some of the monoline insurers guaranteeing these products. The
FSI rose again in March 2008 when Bear Sterns collapsed. It soared to a five
standard deviation away from its historical mean after Lehman Brothers
filed for bankruptcy and AIG was rescued. Stress slowly retreated after the
Federal Reserve expanded liquidity in the market through assets purchase
programs. Finally, there is another peak in May 2010 when markets started
being concerned about a Greek sovereign default.
The literature has proposed different criteria to identify episodes of finan-
cial stress. Cardarelli et al (2009) categorize episodes of financial stress as
those periods when the index is more than one standard deviation above its
trend. They identify the trend using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Given their
set-up of a time-varying trend, it captures the notion that financial systems
have been evolving and financial stress may manifest in different ways. Illing
and Liu (2006) suggest a higher cut-off of two standard deviations above the
mean. A pitfall of this approach is that the number of standard deviations
by which the index exceeds the mean on a given date can change drastically
as observations are added to the sample. As a result, a month could be clas-
sified as one of high financial stress before the addition of new observations,
but a month with low financial stress after the addition of the new observa-
tions. Consider, for example, October 1998. When the index is estimated
using data only until June 2007, the index is equal to 2.6 standard deviations
above the mean, while is only 1.2 when the index is estimated until 2011.
A way to circumvent this problem is to classify a month as stressful when
the value of the cumulative distribution in the month is equal or exceeds
the 90 percentile. An advantage of this approach is that adding extreme
observations has much less effect on the 90th percentile of a sample than
the standard deviation of the sample. As a result, the addition of extreme
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observations is less likely to cause a given month to being classified as high
stress rather than low stress when the sample is changed. If we use the 90th
percentile method to determine whether an event is stressful, October 1998
would be still classified as stressful. However, December 1990 would drop
from the sample of stressful events.
2.5 Financial Stress and the Real Economy
The section starts off by discussing some of the transmission channels of
financial stress to the wider economy that have been proposed in the litera-
ture. The section then lays out the econometric model before discussing the
results. I conclude with some robustness checks and a subsample estimation.
2.5.1 Transmission of Financial Stress
Despite the apparent risk financial stress poses to the real economy, the
relationship between financial stress and economic activity is complex and
not well understood. The literature has, however, proposed a number of
transmission channels. A combination of increased uncertainty, a more el-
evated cost of finance, and tighter credit standards will tend to weigh on
real economic activity. When asset prices are more volatile, firms become
more cautious, and will delay important hiring and investment decisions un-
til the uncertainty is resolved. Households, on the other hand, may decide to
cut back on spending as the increased volatility makes them more uncertain
about their future wealth. Flight to liquidity, flight to quality and increased
asymmetry of information all have the effect of boosting the cost of capital of
business and interest rates on consumer debt in capital markets. In addition,
the tightening of credit standards by financial institutions make it harder to
qualify for loans.
Real option theory emphasizes the value of waiting before making an
investment. A key result of Bernanke (1983) is that high levels of uncertainty
reduce investment today. Firms may interpret financial stress as a reflection
of more uncertain economic conditions in the future and they will pull back on
22
new investment. Depending on how the uncertainty is resolved, this theory
may predict more investment in the future.
The financial accelerator framework developed by Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist (1999) highlights the role of the "external finance premium". This is
the premium that firms pay to obtain external financing and that depends on
firms’ financial position. When the economy is booming, firms post higher
profits and have stronger balance sheets. As a consequence, they appear
less risky, so that banks charge them a lower external finance premium. In
turn, the external finance premium induces firms to make new investments,
which further contributes to economic growth. This mechanism also works
in reverse, but will then generate an "adverse feedback loop". Weakening
economic conditions cause profits to decline and balance sheets to weaken.
To compensate for a higher rate of expected bankruptcies banks charge a
higher external finance premium, which causes firms to invest less. In the
financial accelerator model, the relationship between a firm’s net worth and
the external finance premium depends on the uncertainty of its profitability.
That is, the premium paid by a firm with a low ratio of net worth to its
capital stock and a firm with a high ratio will be greater in a highly uncertain
environment than in a more tranquil one.
Lown and Morgan (2006) suggest that a tightening of credit standards
may lead to an additional decline in spending, beyond that caused by the
increase in loan rates. They find that shocks to credit standards affect lend-
ing and output in a VAR model that control for forward looking variables
(forecasted GDP and interest rate spreads) and firms and banks financial
health. This evidence indicates that changes in credit standards provide an
additional channel through which financial stress may affect economic activ-
ity.
2.5.2 Econometric Model
I analyze the impact of financial stress on economic activity by calculat-
ing the impulse responses to an unpredicted shock to the FSI in a Vector
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Autoregression (VAR) model of real and financial variables.13 The baseline
VAR model includes eight variables; government consumption and invest-
ment (G), net tax revenue (T), output (Y), consumption (C), investment
(I), labor (L), the FSI (F) and a short rate (R):
Zt = [Gt, Tt, Yt, Ct, It, Lt, Ft, Rt]
The definition of the variables and data sources can be found in Appendix
A. The macro literature generally uses the Fed funds rate or three-month
Treasury bill as short term rate. I use the 1-year Treasury rate because the
three month T-bill rate has been around zero over the last year but the Fed
has continued an active monetary policy through quantitative easing targeted
on bringing rates on longer dated government debt down. The model is fitted
to U.S. quarterly data from 1990Q4 through 2011Q1.
All variables except the FSI enter the model in growth rates, consistent
with stationary tests. Based on model-selection criteria, I estimate a VAR
with one lag of the endogenous variables, although the central results are
qualitatively robust to using longer lag lengths. The estimated model has
the reduced form:
Zt = µ+BZt−1 + ut, E(utu′t) = V,
where µ is a 8× 1 vector of constants; B is a 8× 8 matrix of parameters; ut
is the reduced form error and V is the 8× 8 error covariance matrix.
To obtain impulse responses we define the structural error et as:
ut = Aet, E(ete
′
t) = I, V = AA
′,
where A is the matrix with N(N − 1)/2 identification restrictions. I assume
that A is the Choleski decomposition of V . Given the ranking of variables in
Zt, this identification scheme implies that monetary policy responds contem-
poraneously to an unpredicted shock in all variables whereas the FSI responds
13See Chapter 10 and 11 of Hamilton (1994) for a discussion of Vector Autoregression
and impulse response analysis.
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contemporaneously to shocks in all macro variables except monetary policy.
2.5.3 Results
The SVAR analysis shows that economic activity contracts significantly
following an unpredicted financial markets shock. The responses to a one
standard deviation shock in the FSI are presented in Figure 2.2. Tax rev-
enue, output, consumption, investment and labor all decrease following an
adverse shock in financial markets stress. The response of government spend-
ing is not significant and the response of consumption is smaller compared to
the responses of other macro variables. The estimated response of the one-
year Treasury suggests that monetary policy authorities cut interest rates
following a shock in financial markets. In the two years following a shock
to FSI, net taxes fall by a cumulative 2.6 percent, GDP falls by 1.5 percent,
consumption by 0.2 percent, investment by 1.4 percent, hours worked per
capita by 1.6 percent, and the 1-year Treasury rate by 9.2 percent.
2.5.4 Robustness and Subsample Estimation
Shocks to the financial stress index account for about 15 percent of the
long-run variance of, respectively, GDP, investment, net taxes, consumption
and the 1-year Treasury rate. In addition, they explain about 25 percent of
the variance of hours worked per capita.
Results are robust to the order of the variables. Moreover, results are
similar when the responses to a FSI shock are estimated on smaller systems
that include only subsets of the variables in Zt. The results are also similar
when the Fed funds rate is used instead of the 1-year Treasury and the model
is estimated in levels.
Except for consumption, responses to a shock in the FSI are significant
although weaker when the system is estimated excluding the financial crisis
of 2008-09. Figure 2.3 shows the responses to a FSI shock when the system
is estimated until 2007Q4.
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2.6 Monetary Policy and Financial Stress
In this section I examine the potential interaction between monetary pol-
icy and financial stress. The goal is to analyze to what extent monetary policy
can reduce strains observed in the financial markets. I identify changes in
monetary policy by looking at an orthogonalized innovation to Rt. Arguably
this approach is the most widely used identification scheme for this type
of shock. Somewhat comforting, the monetary policy shocks I identify are
highly correlated to shocks identified as in Bernanke and Kuttner (2005).14
I compare the responses to a monetary policy shock in the model pre-
sented above and in the same model without the FSI. In the alternative
model the set of variables is:
Z ′t = [Gt, Tt, Yt, Ct, It, Lt, Rt].
The responses to a monetary policy shock in the two models are presented in
Figure 2.4. Real variables do not respond to a monetary policy shock in the
model without FSI. This is consistent with Barakchianan and Crowe (2010)
who estimate the VAR of Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996) starting
from 1988. This sample excludes the monetary tightening and disinflation
under chairman Volcker. They find that there is no significant contractionary
response of real variables to a monetary policy shock when the model is
estimated starting from the late 80’s. This finding is sometimes explained by
arguing that U.S. monetary policy has become more systematic, and responds
faster to the variables in policymakers’ information set. As a consequence,
the signal/noise ratio of the shock component of policy actions has shrunk,
making it harder to identify the effect of such shocks.
Interestingly, my results suggest that the FSI helps to identify the mon-
etary policy shock, and policymakers’ actions have a significant effect on
financial conditions. In the model with the FSI, the response of investment
to a monetary policy shock is significant. Moreover, FSI responds to a mon-
etary policy shock. In addition, the responses of the labor market and GDP
14Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) use a different identification scheme based on monthly
fed funds futures data that I have time aggregated for comparison.
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growth is significant at 90% confidence level.15 This finding would suggest
that monetary policy gets transmitted through financial markets.
The results change when I re-estimate the system excluding the credit
crunch of 2008-2009 (see Figure 2.5). There is not longer a significant re-
sponse of real variables and FSI to a monetary policy shock in the model
with FSI at 95% confidence level while the response of investment is signif-
icant at 90% confidence level. This leads me to conclude that it is hard to
identify monetary policy shocks when the two biggest shocks are excluded -
the Volker monetary tightening in the early 80’s and the Fed’s assets pur-
chase programs and sharp interest rate cut following the financial crisis of
2008-2009.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter I estimate the impact of financial stress on economic ac-
tivity. Financial stress rises with increases in the expected financial loss on
assets, risk (a higher probability of loss) and uncertainty (reduced confidence
about the distribution of probable loss). I discuss the key characteristics of
financial markets stress and I construct a FSI using principal components
analysis. The index identifies past episodes of financial markets turmoil.
The impulse response analysis of a VAR with real and financial variables,
including the FSI, shows that real variables contract following an unpredicted
financial markets shock. GDP, consumption, investment, labor, and mone-
tary policy all respond negatively to an innovation in the financial stress
index. Moreover, including the financial stress index in the model helps to
identify monetary policy shocks. In addition, my results suggest that mone-
tary policy is transmitted through its effect on financial markets.
The findings presented in this chapter suggest that future macroeconomic
models should study in greater depth how stress in the financial sector spreads
to other sectors. Even prior to the financial crisis of 2008, innovations in FSI
generated effects on key aggregate variables. Future work could also focus on
15In macreconometrics it is common to use 90% or 68% confidence level when the sample
is small.
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the role of FSI in the transmission of monetary policy shocks using different
identification schemes for the monetary policy shock. Another promising
extension would be examining the effect of financial stress on banks’ balance
sheet. In particular, one topical question is to what extent monetary policy
managed to halt deleveraging in recent years.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables in FSI
Variable Mean Standard deviation
TED spread 0.51 0.50
Money market mutual funds total assets 16.78 5.91
Aaa/Treasury spread 1.35 0.47
Baa/Aaa spread 0.95 0.44
High-yield/Baa spread 2.90 1.84
2-year swap spread 0.40 0.20
ABS/Treasury spread 0.58 1.01
MBS/Treasury spread 0.74 0.54
Stock-bond correlation 0.03 0.38
VIX 20.24 8.01
MOVE 102.45 24.10
Off-the-run/on-the-run spread 0.18 0.10
Financial/Corporate bond spread -0.17 0.48
Mortgage spread 1.64 0.32
Note: The table presents descriptive statistics of the variables included in the index. All
interest rate spreads are in percentage points. Money market mutual fund total assets is
measured as percentage of NYSE capitalization. The negative of the stock-bond correlation
is taken, so that negative stock-bond correlation is associated to an increase in financial
stress. The VIX and MOVE indexes are percentage change in monthly prices at annual
rate. Sample statistics are computed from December 1990 until July 2011.
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Table 2.3: Estimated Coefficients on FSI variables
Variable Coefficient in FSI
ABS/Treasury spread 0.11
Baa/Aaa spread 0.11
VIX 0.11
High-yield/Baa spread 0.11
Money market mutual funds total assets 0.10
Mortgage spread 0.10
Aaa/Treasury spread 0.10
2-year swap spread 0.09
Off-the-run/on-the-run spread 0.09
TED spread 0.09
MOVE 0.09
Financial/Corporate bond spread 0.08
Stock-bond correlation 0.07
MBS/Treasury spread 0.04
Note: The table presents weights assigned to each variable in FSI. Each coefficient rep-
resents the change in the index after a one standard deviation increase in the variable.
Each coefficient is estimated by the factor loading of each standardized variable in the
first principal component of the variables correlation matrix, standardized by the variance
of the first principal component. The coefficients are calculated using monthly data from
December 1990 until July 2011.
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Figure 2.1: Financial Stress Index (FSI)
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Note: FSI is measured as number of standard deviations from historical mean and has
unit variance. Index is calculated using monthly data from December 1990 to July 2011.
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Figure 2.2: Responses to a Shock to FSI (1990-2011 sample)
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Note: Responses to one-standard deviation structural shock in FSI over the subsequent
10 quarters. Except for FSI, units are quarterly annualized growth rates. The response of
the FSI is in number of standard deviation from its historical mean. Model is estimated
from 1990Q4 to 2011Q1 using the Choleski decomposition [GTY CILFR]. Dotted lines
represent two standard deviations confidence bands.
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Figure 2.3: Responses to a Shock to FSI (1990-2007 sample)
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Note: Responses to one-standard deviation structural shock in FSI over the subsequent
10 quarters. Except for FSI, units are quarterly annualized growth rates. The response
of FSI is in number of standard deviations from its historical mean. Model is estimated
from 1990Q4 to 2007Q4 using the Choleski decomposition [GTY CILFR]. Dotted lines
represent two standard deviations confidence bands.
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Figure 2.4: Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock (1990-2011 sample)
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Note: Responses to one-standard deviation structural shock in 1-year Treasury rate over
the subsequent 10 quarters. Blue line corresponds to the model with FSI while red line
corresponds to the model without the FSI. Both models are estimated from 1990Q4 to
2011Q1 with Choleski decomposition, respectively, [GTY CILFR] and [GTY CILR]. Ex-
cept for FSI, units are quarterly annualized growth rates. The response of FSI is in number
of standard deviations from its historical mean. Dotted lines represent two standard de-
viations confidence bands.
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Figure 2.5: Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock (1990-2007 sample)
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Note: Responses to one-standard deviation structural shock in 1-year Treasury rate over
the subsequent 10 quarters. Blue line corresponds to the model with FSI while red line
corresponds to the model without the FSI. Both models are estimated from 1990Q4 to
2011Q1 with Choleski decomposition, respectively, [GTY CILFR] and [GTY CILR]. Ex-
cept for FSI, units are quarterly annualized growth rates. The response of FSI is in number
of standard deviations from its historical mean. Dotted lines represent two standard de-
viations confidence bands.
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Chapter 3
Default, Prepayment Risks and
Unobservable Heterogeneity
3.1 Introduction
This chapter draws on insights from option theory to estimate an em-
pirical model that can be used to predict prepayment and default rates on
a portfolio of mortgages. My analysis provides a novel contribution to the
literature by estimating a multinomial logit model that allows for borrower-
specific random coefficients determining the joint probability of prepayment
and default.1 Models with random coefficients could be particularly useful in
this setting, as they capture correlation patterns in the behavior of borrowers
that arise as a result of unobserved heterogeneity, taste variation and path
dependence.
A mortgage may be terminated for a number of reasons. These could be
nonfinancial, such a new job, divorce, or death in the family, prompting a
borrower to change residence. In addition, there are financial reasons, such as
a changing interest rate environment, that could lead to a termination. Using
principles from option theory mortgages can viewed as long-term bond issued
by borrowers who retain embedded call (prepayment) and put (default) op-
tions. Well informed borrowers in a perfectly competitive market, with no
1Multinomial models with random coefficients are also known as mixed logit.
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transaction and reputation costs, will exercise the financial options embedded
in their mortgage contract when doing so increases their net wealth. The key
variables that determine the value of the two options are interest rates and
the value of the underlying property. Borrowers can maximize their wealth
by defaulting on a mortgage when the market value of the mortgage equals
or exceeds the value of the house. Similarly, they can increase wealth by pre-
paying and refinancing their mortgage when the market rate is lower than
the coupon rate on their mortgage.2 While people often prepay mortgages
for personal reasons, this is seldom the case of a default. As a consequence,
default rarely occurs when the value of the property is more than the market
value of the loan.
As prepayment and default are competing risks and mutually exclu-
sive events, I study models in which default and prepayment probabilities
are determined jointly. This approach avoids the mispricing of the two
options.3 Kau and Keenan (1995) provide a complete survey of option-
theoretical models of mortgage pricing. Initially, researchers assumed that
default and prepayment are independent decisions and priced the two op-
tions separately. Cunningham and Hendershott (1984) and Epperson, Kau,
Keenan, and Muller (1985) price default options while Dunn and McConnel
(1981), Buser and Hendershott (1984), and Brennan and Schwartz (1985)
price the prepayment option. However, Titman and Torous(1989), Kau,
Keenan, Muller and Epperson (1992, 1995) provide theoretical option mod-
els in which the optimal default and prepayment strategy are determined
simultaneously.
While the standard options framework provides important insights to the
borrower’s choice problem, it does not fully explain prepayment or default
decisions. Empirical evidence shows that mortgagors do not exercise their
options to prepay and default in the same manner that investors exercise fi-
2In this sense, the homeowner is very much in the position of an issuer of a callable
bond. The issuer of such a bond can pay bondholders some strike price to repurchase the
bond and be free of the obligation to make further payments.
3A homeowner who exercises the default option today gives up the option to default in
the future, but he also gives up the option to prepay the mortgage.
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nancial options.4 Increasingly, researchers have focused on transaction costs
and borrowers’ heterogeneity to explain these differences. For example, the
existence of transaction costs connected to default might imply that nega-
tive equity does not necessarily lead to a default, but that a so-called "trigger
event" needs to occur before the borrower is forced to leave the house. Ex-
amples of such "trigger events" are divorce, illness or job loss. Similarly,
refinancing involves explicit costs like points and a closing fee as well as im-
plicit costs such as reaching the ability to qualify or a possible house price
depreciation that affects the amount that can be borrowed aside from other
factors.5 Kau, Keenan and Kim (1993) discuss how a suboptimal exercise of
a default option can arise in the presence of transaction costs. Quigley and
Van Order (1995), on the other hand, estimate modified option models in
which exercise is a function of both "trigger events" (like unemployment or
divorce) and also the extent to which the default option is "in the money".6
Aside from these reasons, there are also unobservable differences in astuteness
among borrowers.
Empirical models of prepayment and default estimated on micro data can
be divided in two groups: duration models such as the proportional hazard
model (PHM) and multinomial logit models (MNL). The hazard function
in a PHM is constructed in a path-dependent framework, that is, the haz-
ard rate of termination is conditioned on the subject surviving up to time
t− 1. Therefore, any event between t and t− 1 is not an i.i.d. event. Since
Green and Shoven (1986) first introduced the PHM to analyze mortgage
termination as a consequence of refinancing, there have been several major
4See Vandell (1995) for a discussion.
5Points are a form of prepaid interest. One point equals one percent of the loan amount.
By charging a borrower points, a lender effectively increases the yield on the loan above
the amount of the stated interest rate. Borrowers can offer to pay a lender points as a
method to reduce the interest rate on the loan, thus obtaining a lower monthly payment
in exchange for this up-front payment.
6Moneyness is a measure of the degree to which a derivative is likely to have positive
monetary value at its expiration, in the risk-neutral measure. An in-the-money option has
positive intrinsic value as well as time value. A call option is in the money when the strike
price is below the spot price. A put option is in the money when the strike price is above
the spot price. The borrower default option is in the money when the house value of the
house is below the value of the mortgage.
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developments to improve the application of PHM to mortgage termination
analysis. Deng, Quigley and Van Order (2000) and Pennington-Cross and
Ho (2010) apply the PHM allowing correlated competing risks and account-
ing for unobservable heterogeneity as discrete mass points. Their framework
considers the joint survival probability and estimates the conditional proba-
bility of termination risks over time. It acknowledges that only the duration
associated with the type that terminates first is observed. To take this ef-
fect into account, they make an adjustment to the equations describing the
probabilities of competing risks. The duration of the mortgage until termina-
tion by either default or prepayment is a function of option-related variables,
variables that account for observable heterogeneity and variables correlated
with trigger events. They include unobservable heterogeneity by treating
individual mortgage borrowers as coming from three distinct groups with
unobserved characteristics. The three groups of borrowers are very astute,
passive, and others situated in a zone in between these two extremes. The
model cannot directly observe which group each individual belongs to, but it
can estimate the discrete probability distribution that each type influences
the hazard function.
The second type of empirical model of prepayment and default uses a
MNL framework with restructured event history data. The application of
logit models to mortgage termination issues is well established. Mattey and
Wallace (2001), Ambrose and Capone (1998), Berkovec et al. (1998), Archer,
Ling and McGill (1996), Quigley and Van Order (1995), Calhoun and Deng
(2002), Philips, Rosenblatt and VanderHoff (1995), Cunningham and Capone
(1990) and the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) Actuarial Review for
2010 have used binomial logit or MNL models. The MNL directly models
the probability of observing one risk versus another as the probabilities of
termination risks and the probability of continuing to pay must sum to 1.
Thus, an increase in one termination probability must be offset by a decline in
probability for one or more of the alternatives. On the other hand, the MNL
cannot allow for correlations among the termination risks through unobserv-
able variables, as implied by the independence from irrelevant alternatives
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(IIA) assumption.7 In addition, the MNL requires the assumption that the
borrower behavior is independent in each payment period. This assumption
is not an accurate representation of the borrower’s decision process. Clapp et
al. (2006) extend unobserved heterogeneity to the MNL model in the context
of mortgages terminated by refinance or move. They develop a mass-point
mixed multinomial and compare this model to the mass-point PHM of Deng,
Quigley and Van Order (2000). They find that the latter dominates in sam-
ple and out of sample. However, they argue it is sometimes difficult to obtain
convergence for both models. Pennington-Cross (2010) also apply the mass-
point mixed model to examines what happens to mortgages in the subprime
mortgage market once foreclosure proceedings are initiated.
In this chapter, I study the decision of a borrower to default and prepay
using multinomial logit models. As discussed above, MNL models provide
greater flexibility and are extensively used in the literature. I assume that
the probability of default and prepayment are a function of some observable
variables, such as variables that approximate the financial value of the two
options, borrower characteristics, loan characteristics and economic condi-
tions. I analyze the impact of each variable on the borrower’s decision to see
if it follows what economic theory would suggest.
I find that there is unobservable heterogeneity in the effect some variables
have on the borrower’s decision to default and prepay. To account for such
unobservable heterogeneity and time-dependent correlations, I extend the
standard MNL model by allowing the coefficients to be borrower specific
random variables. The use of random coefficients in situations of repeated
choice (like a borrower that has to decide each month whether to make a
mortgage payment) allows the researcher to capture heterogeneity that arises
from behavioral factors such as variation in preferences across households.
I estimate the model on a dataset of single-family 30-year mortgages
guaranteed by FHA.8 Mortgages guaranteed by FHA require a lower down
7The IIA property implied by MNL restricts the odds ratio of choice probabilities, i
and k, so that they do not depend on any other alternatives other than i and k. This in
turn implies no correlation between the unobserved components of utility for alternatives.
See Chapter 3 of Train (2009) for a detailed discussion on MNL and the IIA property.
8The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) is a United States government agency
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payment than conventional mortgages and are considered riskier. Follow-
ing the subprime mortgage crisis, the share of home purchases financed with
FHA mortgages went from 2 percent in 2007 to 15 percent in 2010 as conven-
tional mortgage lending dried up in the credit crunch. Therefore, it is more
important than ever to monitor and model the performance of mortgages
guaranteed by FHA.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the MNL model
with fixed and random coefficients and defines the explanatory variables.
Section 3 describes the data and examines summary statistics. Section 4
discusses the results while Section 5 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Models
At the time of each payment between mortgage origination and matu-
rity, a borrower faces a choice among three alternatives: continue to pay his
mortgage, default or prepay. Each choice is associated with a latent utility.
Define Untj, the utility that borrower n obtains from alternative j at time
t. The borrower chooses the alternative that provides the greater utility at
time t, that is, he chooses Unti if and only if Unti ≥ Untj, ∀j 6= i.
The utility that each borrower receives from each alternative can be de-
composed as Untj = Vntj+²ntj, where Vntj is the part of the utility that we can
observe and it is explained by some observable factors, such as option-related
variables, loan and borrower characteristics. Assume that Vntj is linear in pa-
rameters, Vntj = β′jXnt. The factors that affect the borrower’s choice but are
unobservable are represented by the random term ²ntj. The probability that
borrower n chooses alternative i at time t conditioning on being active at the
beginning of the period is:
Pnti = Prob(Unti > Untj∀j 6= i)
= Prob(Vnti + ²nti > Vntj + ²ntj∀j 6= i)
= Prob(²nti − ²ntj > Vntj − Vnti∀j 6= i).
that insures loans made by banks and other private lenders for home building and home
buying.
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Below I briefly discuss how the MNL with fixed and random coefficients
are derived.
3.2.1 Multinomial Logit with Fixed Coefficients
The MNL model is obtained by assuming that ²ntj are independent and
identically distributed as a Gumbel. The cumulative density of each unob-
served component of utility is:
F (²ntj) = e
−e−²ntj , (3.1)
which means that the error difference is distributed as a logistic:
F (²ntj − ²nti) = F (²∗ntji) =
e²
∗
ntji
1 + e²
∗
ntji
.
The key assumption is that the errors are independent of each other. This
independence means that the unobserved portion of utility from choosing
prepayment is unrelated to the unobserved portion of utility from choosing
default or continue to pay. Moreover, the optimal choice is made in each
period independent of future periods. It follows from (3.1) that:9
Pnit =
eVnti∑2
j=0 e
Vntj
. (3.2)
Normalize to zero the coefficients of alternative j = 0 and we obtain the
familiar multinomial logit model:
Pnt0 =
1
1 + eβ
′
1Xnt + eβ
′
2Xnt
Pnt1 =
eβ
′
1Xnt
1 + eβ
′
1Xnt + eβ
′
2Xnt
(3.3)
Pnt2 =
eβ
′
2Xnt
1 + eβ
′
1Xnt + eβ
′
2Xnt
,
where j = 0 corresponds continue to pay, j = 1 to default and j = 2 to
9See Chapter 3 of Train (2009) for a derivation of (3.2).
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prepay, and β1 and β2 are the parameters vectors.
The assumption underlying a MNL model is that all previous behavior
is captured by the choice in the preceding period, and correlation over time
is induced through time-invariant covariates or thorough variables that are
linked to past conditions, such as a burnout variable to measure foregone
opportunities to refinance at lower interest rates. Logit cannot handle sit-
uations where unobserved factors are correlated over time. The logit can
represent systematic taste variation but not differences in tastes that cannot
be linked to observed characteristics. In addition, the MNL requires IIA: the
odds ratio for any pair of alternatives is independent of any other alternative
and elimination of one alternative does not change the ratios of probabilities
for the remaining alternatives.
The model can be easily estimated by maximum likelihood with loglike-
lihood function:
LL =
N∑
n=1
Tn∑
t=1
2∑
j=0
dntj lnPntj,
where dntj is an indicator variable that takes value 1 when borrower n chooses
alternative j at time t. Because prepayment and default lead to termination,
the observed choice stream of each borrower has a special form. Each bor-
rower n in all periods prior to Tn chooses the alternative continue to pay.
The last element in the choice stream is equal to 1 if the borrower exits the
sample by default, to 2 if he exits the sample by prepayment, to 0 if the loan
matures or if the observation is right censored.
In a MNL model it is also possible to allow the set of explanatory variables
of each alternative to be different. Following the approach suggested by Begg
and Gray (1984), it is possible to estimate separate binomial logit models for
the alternatives continue to pay/prepayment and continue to pay/default,
and then mathematically recombined the parameter estimates to compute
the corresponding multinomial logit probabilities.10 This is the estimation
methodology that I use in the model discussed in Section 3.4.1.
10Define the conditional default and prepayment probabilities estimated by the two sep-
arate logit models as PBnt1 and PBnt2. From Bayes theorem, it follows that the multinomial
conditional probabilities can be computed as Pnt1 =
PBnt1(1−PBnt2)
(1−PBnt1PBnt2)
and Pnt2 =
PBnt2(1−PBnt1)
(1−PBnt1PBnt2)
.
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3.2.2 Multinomial Logit with Random Coefficients
The MNL model fails to capture differences in propensity to exercise the
default and prepayment options that cannot be linked to observed charac-
teristics or that are purely random. Random coefficients are used to capture
correlation in the behavior that is a result of unobserved heterogeneity, taste
variation and path dependence. In a multinomial model with random coef-
ficients, the coefficients that enter the utility function are borrower-specific
random variables from a given distribution. The utility of borrower n at time
t from alternative i is specified as:
Unti = β
′
niXnt + ²nti, i = 0, 1, 2,
where βni varies over decision maker in the population with density f(βi)
of parameters θi. The probability that borrower n makes the sequence of
choices I = {I1, I2, . . . , ITn} is the product of logit probabilities:
LnI =
Tn∏
t=1
[
eβ
′
nIt
Xnt∑2
j=0 e
β′njXnt
]
.
Define β′ = [β′1, β′2] with parameters θ′ = [θ′1, θ′2] and set β0 = 0 as identifica-
tion condition, the unconditional probability is the integral of this product
over all values of β:
PnI =
∫
LnI(β)f(β|θ)dβ.
I assume that βj’s are distributed as independent random normal:
βj ∼ N(µj, σj), j = 1, 2.
For K explanatory variables, µj and σj have length K. Therefore, for J
alternatives the total number of parameters is (K +K) ∗ (J − 1) and the set
of parameters is θ′ = [µ′1, σ′1, µ′2, σ′2].
Multinomial logit model with random coefficients can be estimated by
simulated maximum likelihood. The simulated probability of the sequence
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of choices of borrower n:
PˆnI =
1
R
R∑
r=1
LnI(β
r),
where R is the number of draws and βr is the vector of coefficients of borrower
n in the r draw. PˆnI is an unbiased estimator of PnI by construction. The
simulated probabilities are inserted into the log-likelihood function to give a
simulated log likelihood:
SLL =
N∑
n=1
ln PˆnI .
The maximum simulated likelihood estimator (MSLE) is the value of θ that
maximizes SLL.11 I optimize the simulated log-likelihood function using the
BHHH algorithm of Berndt, Hall, Hall, and Hausman (1974).12 Revelt and
Train (1998) find that optimization algorithms that use an approximation
of the Hessian, such as the BHHH algorithm, resulted in computationally
faster estimation than calculating the Hessian from formulas for the second
derivatives.
3.2.3 Explanatory Variables
This subsection discusses the set of explanatory variables included in the
models that I examine.
Probability of negative equity
The key determinant of the default option is the equity position of the
borrower defined as the difference between the market value of the prop-
erty securing the loan, Ht, and the unpaid principal balance based on the
scheduled amortization, Bt :
EQt = Ht −Bt,
11See Chapter 10 of Train (2009) for the properties of this estimator.
12In the BHHH algorithm the Hessian is approximated with the outer product of the
gradient.
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where H0 is the house price at origination and B0 is the original loan amount.
Ideally, we should have observations of the values of individual properties at
the same frequency of the scheduled mortgage payments. In practice, they
are not available and this introduces significant asymmetries of information
between the borrower and the lender which complicates the computation of
the value of the option. The home value can change as a result of home
improvements (or deterioration) as well as changes in home prices over time
in the local housing market.
I estimate Ht using the OFHEO house price index in the same Metropoli-
tan Statistical Area (MSA) or state in which the property is located. The
OFHEO house price indexes are derived by assuming that individual house
prices obey a non-stationary log-normal diffusion process.13 Based on this
hypothesis, the individual house price appreciation since mortgage origina-
tion is normally distributed with the expected rate of appreciation equal to
the change in the drift of the house price process since mortgage origination
and variance σ2t . The house price index is an estimate of the drift of the
house price process obtained by applying a modified version of the weighted-
repeat-sales methodology of Case and Shiller (1987). Define It the value of
the regional house price index at time t, the estimated expected value of the
house at time t is:
Ht = H0
It
I0
,
which means that house prices in each MSA (or state) grows at the same rate
of the MSA (or state) house price index. Following Deng, Quigley and Van
Order (2000) and Calhoun and Deng (2002), rather than representing the
equity status of the borrower with a point estimate, I compute the ex-ante
13Under the non-stationary lognormality assumption, the logarithm of the individual
house price Hit at time t can be decomposed as ln(Hit) = βt+Vit+Nit, where the drift βt
represents the average behavior of housing values in the region, Vit is a Gaussian random
walk and Nit is a white noise. The Gaussian random walk is such that E[Vi,t+k −Vit] = 0
and E[(Vi,t+k − Vit)2] = ak+ bk2, which means that the deviation of the individual house
price growth rate from the regional growth rate is a quadratic function of time. The white
noise represents purely idiosyncratic differences, that is, E[Nit] = 0 and E[N2it] = c. The
estimated OFHEO regional house price index It is given by It = 100eβˆt , where βˆt is the
estimate of the drift. See Calhoun (1996) for a detailed description on how he OFHEO
house price indexes are constructed.
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probability that at time t the value of the house falls below the outstanding
balance:
Prob(EQt < 0) = Prob(Bt > Ht) = Prob(Bt −Ht > 0)
= Prob
(
Bt −H0 It
I0
> 0
)
.
It follows from the assumption of non-stationary log normality for the house
price process that the probability that the value of the house falls below the
remaining mortgage balance at time t is:
Prob
(
Bt −H0 It
I0
> 0
)
= Φ
 lnBt − ln
(
H0
It
I0
)
σt
 ,
where Φ(x) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function evaluated
at x. The probability of negative equity depends on the loan amortization,
the drift and volatility of the house price appreciation rate.14 Clearly, we
expect that for increasing values of the probability of negative equity the
default risk increases and the prepayment risk decreases.
Mortgage premium and other interest rate variables
The decision to exercise the prepayment option requires comparison of the
scheduled payments with payments under the current refinancing rate. The
value of the call option of the mortgage is a function of the difference between
the present value of the future stream of mortgage payments discounted at
the current market interest rate Rt, and the present value of the mortgage
evaluated at the current note rate, Ct. The value of the call option can be
approximated by the relative spread between the current coupon rate on the
mortgage and the market rate of interest, which I call mortgage premium.15
14The volatility of the individual house price is σt =
√
at+ bt2, where the parameter a
and b are estimated jointly with the house price index when applying the repeated sales
methodology of Case and Shiller. See Calhoun (1996) for a detailed description on how
the OFHEO house price indexes are constructed.
15See Calhoun and Deng (2002) for a derivation of this approximation.
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The mortgage premium MPt at time t is
MPt =
Ct −Rt
Rt
.
For fixed rate mortgages the current coupon is always equal to the coupon
at origination. The prepayment option becomes more valuable as the market
interest rate decreases. The increase in the prepayment risk declines the
probability of default. On the other hand, if the borrower is in negative
equity, a market interest rate lower that the coupon rate may trigger default.
The most responsive borrowers tend to prepay first, so that the remain-
ing sample of borrowers are those with lower conditional probabilities of
prepayment. For this reason, I also include a variable that indicates whether
the borrower has missed a previous refinancing opportunity. I define the
burnout at time t, BURNOUTt, as the 8-quarter moving average number
of basis points the borrower was in the money, in the quarters the borrower
was in the money:
BURNOUTt =
1
8
8∑
k=1
(Ct−k −Rt−k)I(Ct−k −Rt−k > 0),
where I(x) is an indicator function that takes value 1 when x is positive.
Borrowers who do not exercise the prepayment option are likely to be expe-
riencing financial difficulties.
Expectations about future interest rates influence refinancing. For this
reason, the yield curve slope is added to the set of explanatory variables. I
measure the yield curve slope as the ratio between the 10-year and the 1-year
Treasury rate.
Taking vintage effects into account
I add the age of the mortgage in the set of covariates. Conditional pre-
payment and default rates exhibit age patterns: they increase during the first
years following origination, peak sometime between the fourth and seventh
year and decline thereafter. The age profiles can be partly attributed to un-
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observable differences among individuals. The existence of demographic and
economic processes that may trigger mortgage default, and the inability to
measure the diffusion of house prices and the distribution of borrower equity
precisely, imply the need to account directly for age specific differences in
conditional rates of default and prepayment. I consider two different func-
tions to capture the relationship between age and prepayment and default:
a quadratic age function and a piecewise linear function.
Variables describing borrowers’ heterogeneity, transaction costs and
economic conditions
I also consider covariates to account for observable borrowers heterogene-
ity and transaction costs. (1) The LTV ratio is an indicator of the income
and net worth of the borrower at mortgage origination and of his borrowing
constraint. Higher origination LTV increases the probability of default and
lower the probability of prepayment because there is a greater probability
that the borrower will be in a negative equity position early in the life of
the loan. High LTV borrowers are also more likely to have fewer economic
resources to finance the transaction costs of prepayment or endure spells of
unemployment or other trigger events. However, higher LTV ratio at origina-
tion may indicate more strict underwriting standards, or high downpayment
requirements for risky loans, which lower the default risk of mortgages with
high LTV. (2) FICO score at origination.16 The FICO score measures the
consumer’s ability to meet prior financial obligations and is a determinant of
mortgage loan approval. Borrowers with higher credit scores are expected to
default less often and be more easily approved for refinancing. I also insert
a dummy variables that takes value 1 when the credit score of the borrower
is not available.17 (3) An indicator that identifies whether the purpose of
the mortgage was to purchase a home or to refinance an existing mortgage
because these two type of loans have different transaction costs. (4) Dummy
variables for each quarter of the calendar year were also taken into account,
16FICO score measures individuals credit quality on a scale from 300 to 850.
17In the dataset borrower’s credit score is not available for loans originated prior to
2004.
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to control for the potential impact of weather, school schedules, and seasonal
employment patterns on residential mobility. (5) I also include some time
dummy variables to control for the impact of changes in FHA underwriting
standards over time, the subprime market activity period and the housing
crisis.
3.3 Data and Summary Statistics
The dataset is composed of 6000 30-year fixed rate, single-family, owner-
occupied, mortgages originated between 1995 and June 2010 and guaranteed
by FHA. The mortgage history period ends in the second quarter of 2010.
Loans are observed in each quarter from the quarter in which the amor-
tization begins through the quarter of termination, or through the second
quarter of 2010 for loans that are still active. I observe the date in which
FHA receives a claim for mortgage guarantee from the lender. Therefore, I
define a mortgage in default when the lender submits a claim to FHA.
Table 3.2 reports sample statistics of key variables at mortgage origination
and at mortgage termination and Table 3.1 reports variables definitions. The
average loan-to-value at origination of mortgages guaranteed by FHA is 94
percent. This is a much higher value than the typical initial loan-to-value of
conventional mortgages. The average LTV of defaulted loans is 96 percent
which is statistically significantly higher than the average for all mortgages.
Borrowers with higher initial LTV default more often because they are more
borrowing-constrained. The average credit score of defaulted loans is lower
of the average credit score of prepaid loans.
The average age at default and prepayment is similar. By the ninth
year 95 percent of defaulted loans default and 95 percent of prepaid loans
prepay by the tenth year. The average of the estimated probability of being
in negative equity of defaulted loans is almost double the average of the
estimated probability of prepaid loans. The median probability of being
underwater at termination is 8 percent for defaulted loans and 3 percent
for prepaid loans. The average probability of negative equity of outstanding
loans is strikingly high, signaling that we should expect a high default rate
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on these loans. The mean mortgage premium at termination of defaulted
loans is similar to the mean mortgage premium of prepaid loans. When the
call option is out of the money a borrower looks for a way to escape.18 If
he is not borrowing constrained he will refinance otherwise he may decide to
default depending on the amount of equity of the house value he owns.
To gain a better understanding of the relationship between age and de-
fault and prepayment, I conduct a preliminary analysis of our sample using
the non-parametric Kaplan-Meir estimator of the conditional and cumulative
prepayment and default rates.19 Figure 3.1 display the Kaplan-Meier con-
ditional prepayment rate (Panel A), the conditional default rate (Panel B),
the cumulative prepayment rate (Panel C) and the cumulative default rate
(Panel D) at quarterly frequency. The spike in the estimated conditional pre-
payment rate at 80 quarters is due to fewer observations available. As loans
get older the censorship problem becomes more severe, making the estimates
less reliable.
3.4 Specifications and Results
3.4.1 Multinomial Logit Model with Fixed Coefficients
In this section I discuss estimates of a multinomial logit model with fixed
coefficients as defined in equation (3.3). The model is estimated on the
data described in the previous section.20 The explanatory variables that
I consider in the default and prepayment equations are the same but lag
length varies. Therefore, following the approach of Begg and Gray (1984)
18A call option is out-of-the-money when the strike price is above the spot price of the
underlying security.
19Define nt, the number of outstanding loans at time t, and dt,t+∆ and pt,t+∆, respec-
tively, the number of loans that defaulted and prepayed between time t and t + ∆. The
Kaplan-Meier estimate of the conditional prepayment and default rates between t and
t+∆ are:
λp,t,t+∆ =
pt,t+∆
nt
, λd,t,t+∆ =
dt,t+∆
nt
.
20The specification is similar to the model of the Actuarial Review of the Federal Housing
Administration for fiscal year 2009.
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discussed in Section 3.2.1, I estimate two separate logit models for default and
prepayment and then recombine them to get the corresponding multinomial
logit probabilities.
The probability of negative equity, the mortgage premium and the yield
curve slope are lagged by three quarters in the default equation. As discussed
in the previous section, I define a loan in default when a lender submits a
claim for the guarantee to FHA. As the lender’s claim is a consequence of an
earlier decision of the borrower to default, the probability of default should
depend on the value of the put option in the quarter the foreclosure begins.
It takes approximately three quarters between when the lender starts the
foreclosure process and when he submits a claim to FHA. Therefore, the
probability of negative equity, the mortgage premium and the yield curve
slope are lagged in the default equation. This idea is theoretically appealing
and leads to a slightly better statistical fit.
Estimates largely meet expectations in term of statistical significance and
coefficient signs. Table 3.3 presents maximum likelihood estimates of coef-
ficients of the two binomial logit for quarterly conditional probabilities of
mortgage prepayment and default. For all variables except age, the coeffi-
cient represents the contribution of the corresponding explanatory variable
to the estimated probability. For each age variable the coefficient is the slope
of the line segment in the interval between the two knot points.
The results provide strong support for the option theory, according to
which the financial motivation is the main driver governing the prepayment
and default behavior. The simultaneity of the two options is very important
empirically. In particular, factors that trigger one option are also important
in triggering or foregoing exercise of the other. The probability of negative
equity, representing the value of the put option, and the mortgage premium,
representing the value of the call option, have large effect on the estimated
probabilities of prepayment and default. The conditional probability of pre-
payment is positively related to the mortgage premium value and the condi-
tional probability of default is positively related to the probability of negative
equity. In addition, conditional prepayment rates are negatively related to
the probability of negative equity, which is consistent with the expectation
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that borrowers will be less likely to refinance or sell their properties in a
declining housing markets.
While the results support the basic predictions of the option theory, bor-
rowers’ heterogeneity plays an important role as well. The magnitude of the
coefficients corresponding to age, LTV and FICO indicate statistical signif-
icance of borrowers heterogeneity. There is a strong positive relationship
between LTV and default, and little impact on prepayment. The prepay-
ment and default risk increase as the original LTV increases, except for the
highest LTV category.21 Higher default risk is associated with higher original
LTV. This is consistent with the argument that information is asymmetric
and riskier borrowers choose high LTV loans. For loans with original LTV
over 97 percent, all else equal, the probability of default is less than the
probability of default of loans with LTV between 95 and 97 percent. An
possible explanation is that borrowers with very high initial LTV are typi-
cally screened more carefully. The prepayment risk of borrowers with initial
LTV larger than 97 percent decreases because these homeowners have less
resources to pay the transaction costs required when refinancing.
Results indicate that FICO is a good measure of credit quality. Higher
credit scores at origination are associated with large decreases in the proba-
bility of default and more modest increases in the probability of prepayment.
The effect of the burnout is quite remarkable in the default equation.The
burnout is a proxy of the current credit condition of the borrower and miss-
ing opportunities to refinance signals that that the borrower may be credit
constrained. There is a sharp increase of the probability of default when the
burnout is larger than 200 basis points.
The effect of the yield curve slope on prepayment means that borrowers
are more likely to exercise the call option when confronted with upward
sloping yield curve. The slope of the yield curve is generally considered to
be a predictor of economic growth. A steep yield curve signals a growing
economy with rising house prices in which people are more likely to prepay.
The subprime time dummy is positive in both prepayment and default
21A similar finding arises from the prepayment and default model estimated in the 2009
FHA Actuarial Review.
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equations. The dummy for the housing crisis is also significant and points out
that since the housing bubble exploded, the default probability has increased
and the prepayment probability has decreased. There are seasonal variation
in conditional probabilities of prepayment and default although the effect is
very small except for the effect of the spring quarter on prepayment. The
coefficient corresponding to the refinance dummy indicates that loans that
have been originated for the purpose of refinancing an existing mortgage
default and prepay more often.
Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 present the estimated cumulative prepayment and
default rates by year of origination and age. The model predicts termination
of most of the cohorts very well. The default rates of loans originated in
2004-2008 is extremely higher than previous cohorts.
3.4.2 Fixed versus Independent Random Coefficients
This section evaluates to what extent unobservable heterogeneity matters
for modeling default and prepayment options. I compare the MNL model
with fixed coefficients with one that incorporates random coefficients and
check how the estimates presented in the previous subsection hold up.
The estimation of a random coefficients model implies that both the mean
and variance of the distribution for each coefficient will be estimated. In
fact, a fixed coefficients model can be written as a special case of the random
coefficients model, where the variance is assumed to be zero and the fixed
coefficients estimates make up the mean vector of the distribution. I set the
intercept of the random coefficients models presented in this subsection fixed
so that the unobservable heterogeneity in the model can be linked only to
observable variables. I also analyze specifications in which the intercept is
random but the estimate of its standard deviation is not statistically different
from 0.22
Similarly to Deng, Quigley and Van Order (2000), I first estimate a model
that assumes no transaction costs and "ruthless" exercise of the two op-
22Estimates are available upon request.
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tions.23 The explanatory variables included in the model are the probability
of negative equity, the mortgage premium and the age of the mortgage. I
assume a quadratic function for the effect of each of these variable on pre-
payment and default probabilities to control for non linearities.24
The results reported in Table 3.6 show that there is unobservable hetero-
geneity in the borrowers’ decision to exercise the two options. The standard
deviation of the probability of negative equity in the prepayment equation is
significantly different from 0 and has nearly the same magnitude as the esti-
mated mean. This suggests that the effect of a particular borrower’s equity
position on the decision to exercise the prepayment option is quite substan-
tial. There is also heterogeneity in the effect of the mortgage premium on
both the prepayment and default decision. Interestingly, I find that the mean
effect of the mortgage premium on the decision to default is not statistically
different from zero, and its standard deviation is almost as big as the co-
efficient of mortgage premium in default equation in the model with fixed
coefficients. Moreover, the estimated coefficients of the probability of nega-
tive equity and of the mortgage premium in the MNL with fixed coefficients
and their mean in the random coefficients model are quite different.
The unobservable heterogeneity suggested by the "ruthless" model may
be due to omitted variables as this specification does not include any variable
that measures observable heterogeneity or transaction costs. This motivates
me to extend the model in Table 3.6 by adding all the variables that were
also considered in the model presented in Section 3.4.1.25 The results relative
to extended model are presented in Table 3.7. The estimated mean of the
random coefficients corresponding to the probability of negative equity, the
23The term "ruthless" was first applied by Foster and Van Order (1984, 1985). They
defined ruthless default behavior as occurring immediately when the value of the property
dropped below the value of the mortgage.
24In the previous section I use a step function specification to describe how the factors
under consideration affect borrower’s decision. My goal in this section is to study whether
there is unobservable heterogeneity. As simulated likelihood is computationally intensive
assuming quadratic or linear function greatly reduce the number of parameters to estimate.
The shape of the function is a question for a later stage of research.
25The seasonal dummies, "fiscal year of origination < 1992" and "fiscal year of orig-
ination ≥ 1996" were left out because their estimated effect in the model presented in
Subsection 3.4.1 is small.
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mortgage premium, the burnout, the slope of the yield curve and the housing
crisis in the default equation are quite different from the estimated coefficients
in the fixed coefficient model. The mean effect of the mortgage premium, the
burnout, the slope of the yield curve, the housing crisis and subprime market
in the prepayment equation are the ones with the most sizable difference
compared to the fixed coefficients model.
The extended model also shows that there is unobservable heterogeneity
in the effect the probability of negative equity and the mortgage premium
have on the propensity to exercise the prepayment option. It is also note-
worthy that there is unobservable heterogeneity in the effect of the burnout.
The effect of the burst of the housing bubble on the prepayment decision is
very heterogeneous as the magnitude of the standard deviation of the random
coefficient suggests.
The only random coefficient with standard deviation significantly different
from zero in the decision to default is the burnout. The burnout factor mea-
sures whether the borrower has missed previous opportunities to refinance.
The standard deviation of the mortgage premium, which is significantly dif-
ferent from 0 in the ruthless specification, is not significantly different from
zero at 99% confidence level.
Though the random coefficients model has a better fit than both fixed
coefficients models, goodness of fits indicator suggest that the improvements
are relatively small. Since the random coefficients model has a larger param-
eter space than the fixed coefficients model, I use the adjusted log-likelihood
ratio index of Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) to measure goodness of fit. This
index includes a penalty for the number of parameters.26 The relative im-
provement in the likelihood function that one realizes by moving from the
fixed coefficients model to a model with the random coefficients is in line with
the literature. Deng, Quigley and Van Order (2000) document an equiva-
lent improvement in fit when they move from a proportional hazard model
without to one with heterogeneity.
26The formula for the Ben-Akiva and Lerman adjusted log-likelihood ratio index is
1− LL−KLL0 , where K is the number of parameters, LL is the log-likelihood value of the full
model, and LL0 is the log-likelihood value for a model with only an intercept.
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3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I study different random utility models that can be used
to estimate the joint probability that a mortgage defaults or prepays. The
model in Section 3.4.1 can be implemented to project the prepayment and
default probabilities of a portfolio of mortgages given their characteristics
and forecasts of future interest rates and house price. Results show that
factors that trigger one option are also important in triggering or foregoing
exercise of the other. The probability of negative equity and the mortgage
premium have large effect on the estimated probabilities of prepayment and
default. Observable heterogeneity, such as credit score or the burnout, play a
key role. The positive housing crisis dummy show that the default rate since
the beginning of the crisis increased whilst the prepayment rate decreased
because many homeowner are currently in negative equity.
A key issue is the impact of unobservable heterogeneity in borrowers’
propensity to exercise a default or prepayment option. I tackle this question
by comparing MNL models that allows for random coefficients with one that
is estimated under the assumption of fixed coefficients. The results signal a
potentially serious misspecification under the assumption of fixed coefficients.
The random coefficients model fits the data better but the improvement is
small.
I find that the impact of a random coefficients model is most notable in the
borrower’s decision to exercise the prepayment option. The estimated stan-
dard deviation of the random coefficients corresponding to the probability of
negative equity, the mortgage premium and the burnout in the prepayment
equation is almost as big as the mean. This result hints at the presence of
wide heterogeneity in the size of the effects of these factors on a given bor-
rower’s decision to prepay. The effect of the housing crisis on prepayment
also varies widely among borrowers. Turning to the default option, I find
that unobservable heterogeneity only plays a significant role in the case of
the burnout factor.
Future research should compare the MNL model with fixed and random
coefficients out-of-sample as the small improvement in sample could reveal a
58
bigger gain out-of-sample. In addition, it would be interesting to assume that
borrowers could be divided into different groups, each of which has his own
choice behavior. In this case, the vector of coefficients of the prepayment and
default equation has a discrete distribution and the probability of belonging
to each group could be estimated together with the values of the random
coefficients in each group.
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Table 3.1: Variables Definitions
Variable Definition
AGE Age of the mortgage computed from the time
when the principal amortization begins, in
quarters
FICO Fair Isaac credit score at origination
LTV Original loan amount divided by the mini-
mum between the house appraisal value and
purchase price, in percentage
C Mortgage coupon rate, in percentage
PNEG Probability of negative equity computed us-
ing the OFHEO MSA or state house price
index where the house is located
MP Difference between the mortgage coupon and
the conventional mortgage rate in the state
where the property is located divided by the
mortgage coupon, in percentage
SLOPE 10-year Treasury rate divided by the one year
Treasury rate
BURNOUT Moving average number of basis points the
prepayment option was in the money dur-
ing quarters in the money over the preceding
eight quarters
Subprime time Dummy indicating the observation is be-
tween 2004 and 2006
Dummy loan modification tool Dummy indicating the observation is be-
tween 1996 and 2001
Housing crisis Dummy indicating the observation is after
2006 when US house prices started to fall.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics on Mortgage Loans Mean Values at Origi-
nation and Termination
Variable At Origination At Termination
All loans Defaulted Prepaid Outstanding Defaulted Prepaid
LTV 94.460 96.029 94.603 - - -
(6.841) (4.644) (6.742) - - -
FICO 665.561 612.294 653.551 - - -
(65.831) (60.042) (66.317) - - -
C 7.043 7.602 7.627 - - -
(1.346) (1.262) (1.161) - - -
MP 5.185 6.299 4.958 21.386 18.694 19.149
(11.673) (13.416) (11.336) (11.749) (14.887) (12.696)
SLOPE 2.5708 1.5074 1.5469 9.1842 2.8672 2.4236
(2.5057) (0.6811) (0.7731) - (2.7555) (1.9049)
AGE - - - 14.177 17.419 16.175
- - - (15.934) (9.907) (11.872)
PNEG - - - 0.274 0.153 0.076
- - - (0.263) (0.205) (0.131)
Sample size 6000 339 3575 2086 339 3575
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis.
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Table 3.3: Binomial Logit Coefficient Estimates for the
Quarterly Conditional Prepayment and Default Proba-
bilities
Default Prepayment
McFadden R-squared 0.0896 0.0794
Estrella R-squared 0.0045 0.0261
LR-ratio, 2*(Lu-Lr) 33582 202164
LR p-value 0.0000 0.0000
Log-Likelihood -170634 -1171370
Nobs 78007 80226
Nvars 47 44
Variable
Constant -17.670 -8.858
0 ≤ PNEGt−3 ≤ 0.05 -
0.05 < PNEGt−3 ≤ 0.1 0.642 -
0.1 < PNEGt−3 ≤ 0.15 0.806 -
0.15 < PNEGt−3 ≤ 0.2 0.952 -
0.2 < PNEGt−3 ≤ 0.25 1.079 -
0.25 < PNEGt−3 ≤ 0.3 1.088 -
PNEGt−3 > 0.3 1.516 -
0 ≤ PNEGt ≤ 0.05 -
0.05 < PNEGt ≤ 0.1 - -0.382
0.1 < PNEGt ≤ 0.15 - -0.511
0.15 < PNEGt ≤ 0.2 - -0.637
0.2 < PNEGt ≤ 0.25 - -0.737
0.25 < PNEGt ≤ 0.3 - -0.837
PNEGt > 0.3 - -0.692
MPt−3 ≤ 0 -
0 < MPt−3 ≤ 10 0.271 -
10 < MPt−3 ≤ 20 0.472 -
20 < MPt−3 ≤ 30 0.628 -
MPt−3 > 30 0.808 -
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Table 3.3 (continued)
Variable Default Prepayment
MPt ≤ 0 -
0 < MPt ≤ 10 - 0.270
10 < MPt ≤ 20 - 0.814
20 < MPt ≤ 30 - 1.300
MPt > 30 - 1.338
AGEt ≤ 2 3.845 2.114
2 < AGEt ≤ 6 0.695 0.177
6 < AGEt ≤ 8 0.171 -
8 < AGEt ≤ 10 0.098 -
10 < AGEt ≤ 12 0.053 -
12 < AGEt ≤ 14 0.101 -
14 < AGEt ≤ 36 -0.019 -
6 < AGEt ≤ 12 - -0.004**
12 < AGEt ≤ 18 - -0.033
AGEt > 18 -0.054 -0.019
LTV ≤ 80
80 < LTV ≤ 90 0.509 0.071
90 < LTV ≤ 95 0.518 0.260
95 < LTV ≤ 97 0.668 0.293
LTV > 97 0.527 0.206
0 ≥ SLOPEt−3 ≤ 1 -
1 < SLOPEt−3 ≤ 1.2 -0.081 -
1.2 < SLOPEt−3 ≤ 1.5 -0.202 -
SLOPEt−3 > 1.5 -0.157 -
0 ≥ SLOPEt ≤ 1 -
1 < SLOPEt ≤ 1.2 - 0.099
1.2 < SLOPEt ≤ 1.5 - 0.191
SLOPEt > 1.5 - 0.294
0 < BURNOUTt ≤ 50
50 < BURNOUTt ≤ 100 0.124 0.033
100 < BURNOUTt ≤ 150 0.277 0.097
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Table 3.3 (continued)
Variable Default Prepayment
150 < BURNOUTt ≤ 200 0.483 0.075
BURNOUTt > 200 0.850 -0.004*
FICO ≤ 499
499 < FICO ≤ 559 -0.341 -0.070*
559 < FICO ≤ 599 -0.525 0.055*
599 < FICO ≤ 639 -0.745 0.197
639 < FICO ≤ 659 -0.946 0.339
659 < FICO ≤ 679 -1.108 0.383
679 < FICO ≤ 719 -1.417 0.447
FICO > 719 -1.823 0.542
FICO not available -0.716 -0.082*
First calendar quarter
Second calendar quarter 0.003* 0.201
Third calendar quarter -0.067 0.059
Fourth calendar quarter -0.087 0.074*
Subprime time 0.307 0.150
Loan modification tool 0.349 0.240
Housing crisis 0.562 -0.508
Fiscal year of origination < 1992 0.009* -0.017**
Fiscal year of origination ≥ 1996 0.307 -0.040
Loan purpose refinance 0.129 0.166
Note: Binomial logit models are estimated by maximum likelihood. The separate
sets of logit parameter estimates were recombined mathematically to derive the
corresponding multinomial logit for the joint probabilities of prepayment and
default. All variables except age are dummy variables taking value 1 for the
defined categorical outcome. The coefficients corresponding to AGE variables are
the slope of the corresponding piecewise linear segment between the two knots.
Blank entries indicate that outcome is a member of the baseline category. An
asterisk (*) indicates that the coefficient is not statistically significant at the 5
percent level for an asymptotic-normal test. An asterisk (**) indicates that the
coefficient is not statistically significant at the 1 percent level for an
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asymptotic-normal test. A dash (-) indicates that the variable is not included in
the estimated logit equation.
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Table 3.6: Comparison of MNL Model with Fixed and Random Coefficients,
Specification with Only Option-Related Variables and Age
Fixed Random
Adj. LL Ratio Index 0.057 0.062
Log-Likelihood -14436 -14346
Nobs 81582 81582
Nvars 7 7
Variable Default Prepayment Default Prepayment
Constant -8.9428 -4.0176 -9.148 -4.1938
(0.2625) (0.0578) (0.35) (0.0822)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
PNEGt 5.4755 -4.2234 6.2736 0.8894* -5.7236 3.3311
(0.8779) (0.3372) (1.2575) (1.3761) (0.5192) (0.5008)
Squared PNEGt -4.4296 4.1695 -6.1277 1.3901* 4.1603 1.4604*
(1.1125) (0.4209) (2.3926) (2.3097) (0.8388) (1.4152)
MPt 0.0391 0.0445 0.0211* 0.0308 0.035 0.0263
(0.0051) (0.0017) (0.0121) (0.0124) (0.0034) (0.0045)
Squared MPt 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001* 0.001 0.0007 0.0007
(0.0000) (0.000) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0002)
AGEt 0.2952 0.0744 0.3236 0.0021* 0.0885 0.0033*
(0.0259) (0.0062) (0.0362) (0.0216) (0.0077) (0.0105)
Squared AGEt -0.0066 -0.0024 -0.0075 0.0012* -0.0024 0.0001*
(0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0012) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0004)
Note: The MNL model with fixed coefficients is estimated by maximum
likelihood while the MNL model with random coefficients is estimated by
simulated maximum likelihood. In both models prepayment and default are
estimated jointly. The adjusted log-likelihood ratio index follows Ben-Akiva and
Lerman (1985). An asterisk (*) indicates that the coefficient/parameter is not
statistically significant at the 5 percent level for an asymptotic-normal test. An
asterisk (**) indicates that the coefficient/parameter is not statistically
significant at the 1 percent level for an asymptotic-normal test. Standard errors
are reported in parenthesis.
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Table 3.7: Comparison of MNL Model with Fixed and Random Coeffi-
cients, Specification with Variables that Measure Observable Heterogeneity
and Transaction Costs
Fixed Random
Adj. LL Ratio Index 0.06 0.07
Log-Likelihood -14324 -14258
Nobs 81582 81582
Nvars 14 14
Variable Default Prepayment Default Prepayment
Constant -12.0193 -5.1157 -12.7950 -5.0670
(1.5349) (0.3369) (1.8324) (0.3816)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
PNEGt 5.0305 -4.0113 6.1129 0.2940* -4.9304 3.0276
(1.0518) (0.3818) (1.4345) (1.7234) (0.5583) (0.5294)
Squared PNEGt -3.9820 4.2374 -6.1269 1.7535* 4.4222 0.2827*
(1.1708) (0.4423) (2.3553) (1.3689) (0.7709) (1.6285)
MPt 0.0238 0.0511 0.0143* 0.0263** 0.0348 0.0213
(0.0078) (0.0023) (0.0125) (0.0130) (0.0036) (0.0055)
Squared MPt 0.0000* 0.0001 -0.0001* 0.0007* 0.0007 0.0006
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0002)
AGEt 0.2577 0.0966 0.2915 0.0083* 0.1021 0.0030*
(0.0278) (0.0071) (0.0388) (0.0207) (0.0094) (0.0105)
Squared AGEt -0.0063 -0.0025 -0.0074 0.0014** -0.0023 0.0000*
(0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0012) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0004)
LTV 0.0343** 0.0094 0.0375** 0.0046* 0.0072* 0.0001*
(0.0157) (0.0035) (0.0188) (0.0042) (0.0040) (0.0017)
SLOPEt 0.0250* 0.0433 -0.0080* 0.0787* 0.0524 0.0452*
(0.0298) (0.0123) (0.0570) (0.0718) (0.0199) (0.0455)
BURNOUTt 0.0036 -0.0030 0.0016* 0.0064 -0.0021 0.0024
(0.0012) (0.0004) (0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0006) (0.0008)
FICO -0.0009 0.0002* -0.0009 0.0001* -0.0003* 0.0001*
(0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0015) (0.0002) (0.0007)
Subprime 0.1802* 0.0990** 0.2116* 0.3677* 0.2466 0.0779*
(0.1660) (0.0503) (0.2535) (0.6780) (0.0603) (0.2984)
Housing crisis 0.5532 -0.6806 0.6500 0.2935* -0.9770 1.2624
(0.2016) (0.0832) (0.2748) (0.5521) (0.1809) (0.2068)
Loan Purpose Refinance 0.3812** 0.1298** 0.1371* 0.8926* 0.1231* 0.1854*
(0.1937) (0.0610) (0.5340) (0.7824) (0.0758) (0.3038)
Note: The MNL model with fixed coefficients is estimated by maximum
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likelihood while the MNL model with random coefficients is estimated by
simulated maximum likelihood. In both models prepayment and default are
estimated jointly. The adjusted log-likelihood ratio index follows Ben-Akiva and
Lerman (1985). An asterisk (*) indicates that the coefficient/parameter is not
statistically significant at the 5 percent level for an asymptotic-normal test. An
asterisk (**) indicates that the coefficient/parameter is not statistically
significant at the 1 percent level for an asymptotic-normal test. Standard errors
are reported in parenthesis.
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Figure 3.1: Kaplan-Meier Estimate of Quarterly Prepayment and Default
Rates
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Concluding Remarks
In this dissertation I study specific financial risks that have played dom-
inant roles in the US financial crisis of 2008-09. Chapter 2 estimates the
impact of financial stress on economic activity using a structural VAR anal-
ysis. In the chapter, I show that there is a multidimensional response of the
real economy to financial stress. GDP, consumption, investment, labor, and
monetary policy all respond negatively to an unexpected shock to the finan-
cial stress index even prior to the financial crisis of 2008. In addition, my
results suggest that including financial stress in the analysis helps to identify
monetary policy shocks.
Reading Chapter 2, it is natural to ask how sensitive the results are to the
methodology used to estimate the level of financial stress. Preliminary works
suggests that my results are fairly robust. Brave and Butters (2011) estimate
a financial condition index as the latent factor of more than one hundred fi-
nancial indicators that have mixed frequency and different starting dates of
available data. In this way, they expand data history and coverage. They
apply the large approximate dynamic factor framework of Doz, Giannone,
and Reichlin (2006) for the estimation. In my work, I measure the level of
financial stress with the first principal component of the correlation matrix
of 14 financial variables. The index that I construct in Section 2.4 is strongly
correlated with the index proposed by Brave and Butters (2011). Not sur-
prisingly, using their index in the model presented in Section 2.5.2 would not
affect the results.
Turning to future research I want to investigate how the results presented
in Section 2.6 hold up under alternative ways to identify monetary policy
shocks. The accuracy of estimates of the effects of monetary policy depends
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crucially on the validity of the measure of monetary policy that is used. In
my identification scheme for monetary policy shocks I use orthogonalized in-
novation to the short term interest rate. Arguably this is the most popular
methodology for identifying such shocks but the literature has also proposed
alternative schemes. For example, Kuttner (2001) turns to Fed funds fu-
tures data to separate changes in the target funds rate into anticipated and
unanticipated components. In this dissertation, I show that my monetary
policy shocks are highly correlated to shocks that are time aggregated from
an identification scheme close to Kuttner (2001) but more research is needed
to examine the robustness of my results. I certainly would like to examine
how my results hold up when monetary policy is identified as in Romer and
Romer (2004). Romer and Romer (2004) identify monetary policy shocks
with changes in the federal funds rate that are the result of deliberate deci-
sions by the Federal Reserve made at meetings for which there is a forecast
prepared by the staff. They then remove the portions of these moves in the
intended funds rate that represent the Federal Reserve’s usual response to
its economic forecasts. The resulting series is largely free of interest rate
movements that are either endogenous responses to economic developments
or attempts by policy makers to counteract likely future developments.
A number of other extensions to the work presented in Chapter 2 also
come to mind. One extension is a cointegration analysis of the empirical
macro model presented in Section 2.5.2. Finally, I would like to examine
more closely how financial stress affects banks’ balance sheets. In essence I
would like to improve our understanding of how monetary policy has been
transmitted through the financial system in recent years. My results certainly
suggest that the transmission of looser monetary policy primarily happens
through a reduction of stress on financial markets. In turn, a fall in financial
stress improves the real economy (as shown by e.g. a strong response of
labor market variables). However, questions remain on how monetary policy
can ease funding conditions for banks (on the liability side of banks’ balance
sheet) or promote different forms of lending (on the asset side).
In Chapter 3, I study random utility models to estimate the default
and prepayment probabilities of a mortgage given its characteristics and the
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macroeconomic environment. The model presented in Section 3.4.1 can be
used for mortgage pricing and a cost-benefit analysis of different mortgage
policies. In fact, following the increase in mortgage defaults due to sharp
fall in US house prices in 2007 legislators have been proposing different pro-
grams to modify the terms of mortgage contracts of underwater borrowers.
The models in this dissertation can be used to evaluate the effect of these
proposals in limiting future mortgage defaults.
The work done in Chapter 3 can also serve as foundation for further re-
search. First, I would like to develop an appropriate methodology to compare
random utility models with and without random coefficients out-of-sample.
The in-sample comparison of MNL models with fixed and random coefficients
in Section 3.4.2 signals a potentially serious misspecification under the as-
sumption of fixed coefficients. Moreover, the impact of a random coefficient
model is most notable in the borrower’s decision to exercise the prepayment
option.
Another objective is to apply Bayesian methods to estimate the MNL
model with random coefficients. In this dissertation I estimate the multino-
mial model with random coefficients using simulated likelihood. However,
simulated likelihood is a computationally intensive method, even with to-
day’s computing power, and there could be substantial gains in alternative
estimation techniques. Such techniques could support the practical imple-
mentation of MNL models with random coefficients for mortgage and policy
analysis.
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Appendix A
This appendix describes the data used in the VAR model discussed in
Chapter 2.
G The sum of real federal, state, and local government consumption ex-
penditures and gross investment, chained dollars, seasonally adjusted
annual rate, NIPA.
T The sum of real federal, state, and local government receipts less trans-
fer payments, federal grants-in-aid, and net interest paid, chained dol-
lars, seasonally adjusted annual rate, NIPA.
Y Real GDP, chained dollars, seasonally adjusted annual rate, NIPA.
C Real personal consumption expenditures on non durable goods, chained
dollars, seasonally adjusted annual rate, NIPA.
I The sum of real gross private investment and personal consumption
expenditures on durable goods, chained dollars, seasonally adjusted
annual rate, NIPA.
L Hours per capita in non-agricultural establishments, computed as the
ratio between aggregate hours in non-agricultural establishments and
civilian population aged 16-year and older, seasonally adjusted annual
rate, BLS.
R One-year Treasury bill rate, Federal Reserve Bulletin H.15.
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